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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The importance of closure 
 
This study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the closure process 
for programmes funded under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 
the Cohesion Fund (CF) in 2007-13. Programme closure is often seen as a purely technical 
process. It involves shutting down the operation of a programme, finalising the reporting and 
recording of results, and ensuring sound financial management. This includes the preparation 
of DVHULHVRIGRFXPHQWVIRUHDFK2SHUDWLRQDO3URJUDPPH23WKDWWRJHWKHUIRUPWKHµFORVXUH
SDFNDJH¶ an application for payment of the final balance, a Final Implementation Report and a 
closure declaration. This required contributions by three main programme management bodies 
in the Member States (MSs): Managing Authorities (MAs), Certifying Authorities (CAs) and Audit 
Authorities (AAs).  
 
Closure also plays an integral role in the successful implementation of programmes. Key 
strategic decisions are taken by programme authorities at this stage in the allocation of 
remaining funds; in securing and raising awareness of achievements and legacies; and, in 
ensuring a smooth transition to the next programming period. These decisions are taken in the 
context of considerable pressures: to absorb the maximum funding available; to respond to 
financial controls and audits that often take place around programme closure; to deal with 
issues arising from the implementation of specific projects; and, to ensure adequate 
administrative resources at a time of overlap between programming periods.  
 
Closure in 2000-06: a review of experience 
 
A review of the experiences of programme closure at the end of the 2000-06 showed 
that programme authorities faced challenges related to efficient spending of EU funds 
against closure deadlines. Challenges were also encountered in the closure of specific types 
of project, including major projects (MPs). There were also difficulties in allocating 
sufficient human and organisational resources to closure tasks. Programme authorities 
developed a range of responses to these issues: the establishment of closure coordination 
mechanisms; the dissemination of guidance and advice to implementation bodies and 
beneficiaries; strengthening the focus on financial monitoring, audit and control; and, 
implementing different initiatives to address absorption pressures. These issues and responses 
provide the basis for the framework applied to the analysis of closure in 2007-13. 
 
Closure 2007-13: the regulatory framework 
 
Responding to experiences from closure in 2000-06, regulatory provisions were introduce 
(Regulation 1083/2006, Articles 88-91), as well as guidance and support for 2007-13. These 
set the regulatory framework and timetable, and included specific guidance (based on 
Commission Decision C(2015) 2771 final) to ensure timely and regular spending. It 
included: allowing an OP to overspend 10% in a particular Priority Axis without formally 
amending it; the option for MAs to develop a project pipeline that is bigger in volume than the 
ILQDQFLDOVFRSHRIWKHSURJUDPPHWRFUHDWHDILQDQFLDOµEXIIHU¶RUUHVHUYHOLVWRISURMHFWVDQG
WKHRSWLRQRIµSKDVLQJ¶SURMHFWVDFURVVWZRSURJUDPPLQJSHULRGVOf particular importance 
are audit aspects to ensure that any irregularities are not delaying financial absorption. For 
2007-WKHµVLQJOHDXGLW¶DSSURDFKSXWLQSODFH a multi-level control system integrated on the 
basis of clearly defined responsibilities for EU level and MS auditors, established standards for 
the work required, and reporting systems and feedback mechanisms. Provisions and 
guidelines to deal with specific types of operation included the extension of eligible 
spending and additional reporting requirements for FEIs, as well as potential phasing for MPs. 
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7KH(&¶VFORVXUHJXLGHOLQHVDOVRPDGHSURYLVLRQIRUWKHWUHDWPHQWRInon-completed projects. 
Provisions directly related to governance and administration included the strengthened 
role of AAs as dedicated bodies in charge of OP auditing. The EC adopted a proactive approach 
to the closure of the 2007-13 programming period, with an increased focus on training and 
capacity-building for programme authorities. A dedicated Closure Unit was established in the 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy to coordinate closure procedures and provide 
support to MS. 
 
Closure 2007-13: Member State experiences 
 
Programme authorities have taken measures to balance the demands of effective 
absorption and efficient closure but, generally, a focus on the former has put pressure 
on the latter. The impact of absorption pressures during the closure process on the strategic 
quality of interventions was limited. The implementation of certain types of intervention 
has had implications for the closure process. This applies particularly to FEIs, MPs and 
non-functioning projects. In spite of EU provisions and MS actions attempting to address these 
issues, challenges remain, largely related to uncertainties in regulations and guidance and in 
some cases limitations in capacity and experience.  
 
The quality of the closure process has been determined by the administrative capacity 
and governance approaches of programme authorities. Efficient programme closure has 
relied on the coordinated input of actors and structures at EU, national and programme levels 
at a time when administrative resources are constrained or in flux as a result of the launch of 
OPs for the next programming period.  
 
MS approaches to address these tensions included the establishment of guidance and 
coordination mechanisms between programme and national level, and coordination 
arrangements at programme level (e.g. through working groups). Programme authorities 
have developed systems to identify and target at an early stage projects at risk of non-
completion. They also looked to ensure sufficient capacity for closure through: 
recruitment, outsourcing, appointing closure managers etc. Programme authorities are 
increasingly aware of the communication advantages of closure documents and the 
opportunities to disseminate programme achievements through the closure package. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The formal closure of ERDF and CF programmes in 2007-13 was carried out efficiently. 
However, beyond this formal process, closure should be perceived as an integral part of 
programme implementation and this role is conditioned by financial absorption 
pressures, the type of operations included in programmes and administrative 
capacities. Financial absorption pressures are prominent as closure approaches. These relate 
to specific types of intervention with complex associated regulations and where MS capacity or 
experience is limited (e.g. FEIs and MPs). EC initiatives and MS arrangements have addressed 
these pressures. Across MSs, the quality of the closure process has depended on administrative 
capacity and governance approaches.  
 
EC closure guidance was valued by MSs in 2007-13. However, programme authorities 
noted that it has to be provided at an early stage, be clear and consistent.  
  
Lessons learnt from the Closure of the 2007-13 Programming Period 
 
 
9 
 
Looking forward, some key recommendations for 2014-20 can be made: 
x Linking closure more closely to the reporting of programme achievements and outputs 
would strengthen efforts to communicate achievements µRQWKHJURXQG¶ 
x 7KH(&¶VHIIRUWVWR build capacity for closure should continue, especially for AAs.  
x MS guidance, support and structures should be established, building on or working 
alongside EU-level support for closure.  
x For MAs, closure should be regarded as an issue for the lifetime of a programme, not 
just for the final years.  
x Closure should remain a priority for programme authorities and project sponsors, and 
to ensure commitment from all those involved in closure. 
x Close formal and informal coordination between programme authorities involved in 
closure is recommended.  
x Given that administrative tasks associated with closure are substantial, MS and 
programme authorities must ensure that sufficient capacities are made available 
(training, recruitment, outsourcing etc.). 
x The UK case is exceptional. Closure arrangements will depend on the Withdrawal 
Agreement to be negotiated after triggering Article 50 in March 2017. The two-year 
withdrawal process indicates that the programming period will be shortened in the UK, 
creating significant challenges. First, regulatory procedures around N+3 and closure 
mean that the UK would still be subject to EU regulations for at least three years after 
withdrawal. Second, the process will be complicated by audit requirements that 
continue beyond closure and therefore after Brexit. Third, these issues will be played 
out in a context of organisational flux and reduced capacity as UK programme 
authorities break up and shed staff. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
This study provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the closure process for 
programmes funded under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion 
Fund (CF) in 2007-13. The deadline for the submission of closure documentation by Member 
States (MS) to the European Commission (EC) fell at the end of March 2017. Thus, it is timely 
to assess the process in order to identify key lessons and insights and examples of good 
practice, particularly with a view to the progress of the 2014-20 closure arrangements. 
Programme closure is often seen as a purely technical process: the fulfilment of legal, 
regulatory and bureaucratic requirements at the end of a programming period. The formal 
obligations associated with closure are important (see Figure 1): 
x Foremost is the need to ensure that programmes are fully committed (i.e. that all 
programme funds are committed by the managing authority (MA) to projects, 
defined in Funding Agreements) and spent (i.e. that expenditure incurred by 
projects is fully paid), while recognising the tension between being able to spend for 
as long as possible and having enough time to organise closure. 
x Settling of the final balance, which clears all preceding expenditure to operations or 
the recovery of sums paid in excess by the EC, is the aspect of closure emphasised in 
the Financial Regulation. 
x Ensuring legality and regularity of expenditure, as the EC is required to accept only 
expenditure implemented in compliance with the EU and national rules.  
x The process of terminating a programme, consisting of the submission to the EC of 
DµFORVXUHSDFNDJH¶RIGRFXPHQWVIURPWKH0$$$DQG&$ 
 
Figure 1: The challenges of programme closure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EPRC. 
 
However, there is a danger that closure is perceived as a formal appendage to the management 
and implementation process, or even as an after-thought. It is crucial to look beyond the formal 
components of closure to appreciate the integral role it plays in the successful implementation 
of ERDF and CF programmes. Key strategic decisions are taken by programme authorities at 
this stage in the life of an OP: in the allocation of remaining funds; in securing and raising 
awareness of programme achievements and legacies; and, in ensuring a smooth transition to 
the next programming period. Moreover, these key decisions are taken in the context of 
Successful 
programme 
closure
Timely spend
Payment of 
balance
Compliance
Closure 
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2 
considerable pressures: to absorb the maximum funding available, to respond to financial 
controls and audits that often take place around programme closure, to deal with issues arising 
from the implementation of specific projects; and, to ensure that adequate administrative 
resources are available at a time of overlap between programming periods. It is important that 
lessons learned from the closure process are fed into planning for future programmes, alongside 
the results of monitoring and evaluation processes (see Figure 2). For all of these reasons, 
closure represents a key stage in the lifecycle of OPs.  
Figure 2: The dual role of closure in the programme lifecycle 
 
Source: EPRC. 
1.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of the study is to provide a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the 
closure process for programmes funded under ERDF and CF in 2007-13. The study assesses 
the experiences of programme authorities in complying with the formal requirements for OP 
closure and, beyond this, the relationship between the closure process and the effective 
implementation of programmes. A crucial outcome of the study is the identification of key 
lessons, insights and examples of good practice, particularly with a view to the progress of the 
2014-20 closure arrangements.  
 
Within this, the research includes two specific aims: 
x To undertake a dynamic, longitudinal analysis, comparing closure processes in 2007-13 
with 2000-06, identifying what has worked and drawing lessons for 2014-20. 
x To provide multi-dimension/level conclusions for cohesion policy (CP) as a whole, but 
also for (a) different types of programmes/projects; and (b) different levels in the 
system (EC, MS, programme authorities). 
 
The methodological approach is focused on key variables that can have an impact on the closure 
process. Based on a review of the literature, particularly related to experiences from the closure 
process 2000-06 it is possible to identify variables that can affect the closure process, not just 
XQGHUVWRRGDVIRUPDOSURJUDPPHFORVXUHREOLJDWLRQVEXWLQWHUPVRIFORVXUH¶VFUXFLDOUROHLQWKH
implementation of programmes. These are: 
 
x Absorption pressures. Fundamentally, closure requires efficient absorption of the EU 
funds available under an OP. Ideally, programmes aim to be reaching 100% or more of 
Strategic analysis
Planning investment 
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Project development
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funds fully committed to operations. In reality, synchronising the achievement of 
absorption targets and the implementation of closure processes is not straightforward. 
x Types of intervention. Different types of operation have different implications for 
absorption and closure. For instance, major projects (MPs) absorb substantial funding 
DQGFDQEHµSKDVHG¶RYHUWZRSURJUDPPLQJSHULRGVEXWDUHSDUWLFXODUO\DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ-
intensive because of the special requirements associated with them, including closure 
requirements. 2007-13 saw increased allocations for Financial Engineering Instruments 
(FEIs) in OPs and there are specific technical requirements and challenges related to 
these at the closure stage. 
x Administrative capacity. Managing the closure of 2007-13 programmes is a 
challenging task, involving responding to the pressure to spend efficiently and effectively 
with demonstrable impacts, while negotiating the transition period between programme 
cycles, moving towards closure of one set of programmes, and at the same time 
developing and implementing CP programmes in place for the 2014-20 period.  
 
Key research questions are: 
x How have programme authorities approached the key tasks involved in programme 
closure? What bottlenecks or facilitators have they encountered?  
x To what extent has the closure process been conditioned by issues related to absorption 
pressures, type of intervention or administrative capacity?  
x What relationship is there between these closure-related pressures and effective 
programme implementation?  
x Looking forward, what are the most important insights and lessons to be carried over 
into the implementation and closure of OPs in 2014-20? 
 
1.3 Methodology 
Before outlining the methodology used for this study, it is important to note that an important 
caveat of this research is its timing. It coincided with the last weeks of closure preparations in 
the MSs and therefore no information was yet available on the actual outcomes after the 
submission of the closure documents.1 The research included four key tasks: review of the 
evolution of closure processes in CP across programming periods; development of the analytical 
framework; case study research; and conclusions and recommendations. These involved a 
combination of desk-based research and interviews at EU and MS levels, detailed below. 
 
1) Review of the closure procedures in 2000-06 and 2007-13. Focussing on ERDF 
and CF, this includes legislative documents (regulations, implementing and delegated 
acts), official guidance documents, relevant EU and MS evaluations, reports (such as 
the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report on closure preparations2), academic articles 
and studies on the closure process. An important role is played by information gathered 
in the context of long-standing EPRC comparative research conducted under the 
auspices of the IQ-Net network (Improving the Quality of Structural Funds 
Management3). 
 
                                          
1  Initial indications in early April were that virtually all closure packages were successfully submitted by the deadline. 
However, by the time of writing it was too early to access information on the quality or any issues arising from the 
(&¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVHSDFNDJHV 
2  European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and 
rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016. 
3  http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet  
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2) Interviews with EC bodies. Interviews with over 20 staff members of DG REGIO have 
been carried out, including the Closure Unit, two geographical units and others. For a 
full list of interviewees see Annex 2. 
 
3) Research at MS level. The analysis of closure procedures in individual OPs and the 
experiences made by programme authorities provide a central component of the 
research. This allows comparative insights into closure processes and their relationship 
with the key variables. Moreover, case study interviews are vital to identify practical 
H[SHULHQFH RI FORVLQJ 23V µRQ WKH JURXQG¶ 7KXV DV ZHOO DV GRFXPHQWDU\ UHVHDUFK
research included 20 interviews with key organisations and actors involved in the closure 
process, mostly MAs and AAs. The selected cases are individual OPs in eight MSs 
representing an as representative as possible sample of programmes across the EU28. 
The main criteria for the selection reflected the three main research questions and the 
three sets of variables included in the analytical framework (funding absorption, types 
of operation, governance and administration). Additional selection criteria included 
geographical representativeness, different governance models (e.g. national and 
regional OPs) and different sources of funding (i.e. ERDF or Cohesion Fund). Table 1 
provides an overview of the selected cases and the semi-structured questionnaire used 
for interviews with MAs and AAs is included in Annex 1. 
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Table 1: Selected OPs for the analysis of MS experiences 
MS 
Absorption 
Progress 
Types of interventions Governance & administration Selected OP 
  MPs FEIs Fund(s) CP Objective OP type 
Capacity 
(EQI)* 
 
DE 
 
Steady No Yes ERDF RCE Regional Strong Bavaria  
FI 
 
Steady No Yes ERDF RCE Regional Strong West Finland  
FR 
 
Steady No Yes ERDF RCE Regional Strong Centre  
IT 
 
Slow Yes Yes ERDF RCE Regional Weak Lombardy  
GR 
 
Slow Yes 
 
No CF & ERDF Convergence Thematic Weak Reinforcement of 
Accessibility  
RO 
 
Slow Yes 
 
No CF & ERDF Convergence Thematic Weak Transport  
PL 
 
Steady Yes 
 
Yes ERDF Convergence Regional Weak Pomorskie  
UK 
 
Steady Yes Yes ERDF Convergence Regional  Strong West Wales and the Valleys  
Notes: *European Quality of Government Index (EQI) https://nicholascharron.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/publishing-the-eqi-data.xlsx. See also Figure 16. 
Source: &KDUURQ1'LMNVWUD/DQG/DSXHQWH9µ0DSSLQJWKH5HJLRQDO'LYLGHLQ(XURSH$0HDVXUHIRU$VVHVVLQJ4XDOLW\RI*RYHUQPHQWLQ(XURSHDQ5HJLRQV¶6RFLDO
Indicators Research, vol 122 (2): 315-346, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-014-0702-y 
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1.4 Structure of the study 
The study is structured in four further sections: 
x Section 2 VHWVRXWWKHVWXG\¶VUHVHDUFKcontext. This includes evidence from analyses 
of the closure of programmes in the 2000-06 period, reviewing EU-wide trends, 
identifying closure challenges and noting the responses of programme authorities to 
these. This leads into a description of the analytical framework adopted for this study 
ZKLFKµXQSDFNV¶WKHNH\YDULDEOHVXVHGWRH[SORUHWKHFORVXUHH[SHULHQFHVRISURJUDPPH
authorities.  
x Section 3 turns to closure experiences in the 2007-13 period. It sets out the regulatory 
provisions, guidance and support put in place by the EC for closure in 2007-13, 
highlighting how these addressed issues related to the key variables identified in the 
research. 
x Section 4 assesses the closure experiences of programme authorities in the context of 
these provisions. It explores the efficiency of the programme closure process, its 
relationship with the effective implementation of OPs as a whole and the role of 
absorption pressures, closure issues stemming from the implementation of specific 
intervention types, and issues related to governance and administration in this.  
x Section 5 draws together the key lessons learned from the study, developing a set of 
main conclusions and recommendations for EU-level institutions and programme 
authorities. 
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2. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
KEY FINDINGS  
 A review of the experiences of programme closure at the end of the 2000-06 
period provides important context for the research. Programme authorities faced 
challenges related to efficient spending of EU funds against closure deadlines. 
Challenges were also encountered in the closure of specific types of project, including 
major projects. There were also difficulties in allocating sufficient human and 
organisational resources to closure tasks. Programme authorities developed a range 
of responses to these issues: the establishment of closure coordination mechanisms; 
the dissemination of guidance and advice to implementation bodies and beneficiaries; 
strengthening the focus on financial monitoring, audit and control at closure; and, 
implementing different initiatives to address absorption pressures. These issues and 
responses, summarised under three headings (absorption, types of intervention, 
administrative capacity), provide the basis for the framework applied to the analysis of 
closure in 2007-13.  
 
2.1 Lessons from closure, 2000-06 programming period 
Before applying this analytical framework to programme closure in 2007-13, a review of the 
experiences of programme closure at the end of the 2000-06 period provide an 
important starting point. A broad overview of EU-wide trends in the time and status allocated 
by programme authorities to the closure process shows significant variation. Analysis of the 
2000-06 closure process in different MS contexts highlights the most prominent challenges 
from the perspective of programme authorities and produces insights into the measures taken 
to address them. These issues from 2000-06 informed EC closure guidance for 2007-13. 
2.1.1 EU-wide trends 
 
Reviewing the approaches of programme authorities to closure in 2000-06, there was significant 
variation across MS. This variation included: 
x Differences in the emphasis placed on closure as part of the implementation 
process. While some programme authorities had started planning for closure by mid-
2005, others did not see this as a major task until much later in 2007.4 
x Variation in the time taken between the submission of closure documents to 
the EC to complete closure. For example, EU-wide around 20% of ERDF OPs took 6 
months to a year to complete closure, 30% took 1-2 years, 20% took 2-3 years and 
15% took 3-4 years. For 14% of ERDF OPs closure took more than four years.5 
 
In recognising the varied time that elapsed between submission of closure documents and final 
closure, it is important to note that for the 2000-06 period no annual summary of controls and 
audit results was prepared by programme authorities (as is the case in 2007-13). At closure, 
programme authorities had to provide assurance, based on a sample check, as to the legality 
DQGUHJXODULW\RIDOOH[SHQGLWXUHGXULQJWKHSHULRG7KH(&¶VDQDO\VLVDQGYHULILFDWLRQVOHGLQ
many cases to requests for clarification or additional work at MS level, which often extended 
                                          
4  Davies S and Gross T (2007) The end of the formal programming period 2000-2006, IQ-Net Review Paper 19(1), 
European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
5  European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and 
rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016. 
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the closure process. An overview of the time it took the EC DGs to close 2000-06 cohesion and 
rural development programmes is provided in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Time taken to close 2000-06 programmes 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 
cohesion and rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016, 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_36/SR_CLOSURE_2007_2013_EN.pdf 
 
Unresolved closure issues go back to the period 1994-99 and before, as DG REGIO is still 
dealing with irregularities from the 1989-93 programming period. For the 2000-06 
programming period, 18 out of a total of 379 ERDF OPs had still not been closed at the end of 
DFFRUGLQJWR'*5(*,2¶VDQQXDODFWLYLW\UHSRUWIRU6 and in early 2017, some of 
these are still open as remaining irregularities are addressed. Also, 57 CF projects funded in 
that period had not yet been closed in January 2017 (see Table 2). In its management plan for 
2016,7 DG REGIO aimed to close any unresolved irregularities in open 2000-06 ERDF OPs within 
one year of their submission and to close all CF projects from 2000-06 by the end of 2016, 
excluding any judicial proceedings. 
                                          
6 DG Regional and Urban Policy (2016a) 2015 Annual Activity Report, 27 April 2016, pp. 78-80.  
7 DG Regional and Urban Policy (2016c) Management Plan 2016, 1 April 2016, p. 15. 
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Table 2: 2000-06 CF projects still open in January 2017  
MS Number of open projects 
Romania 21 
Greece 12 
Poland 10 
Bulgaria 6 
Lithuania 4 
Portugal 2 
Estonia 1 
Spain 1 
Total 57 
Source: European Commission. 
2.1.2  Specific closure challenges  
 
Within these broad trends, programme authorities highlighted some specific closure 
challenges. Programme authorities had differing views of the main challenges relating to 
programme closure but some basic issues could be identified:8  
 
In many programmes, the main challenges were seen to relate to efficient spending. 
Programme authorities balanced the aim of ensuring optimal absorption of the available funds 
with the need to meet closure deadlines and allow sufficient time for the closure process to take 
place. In this context, it should be noted that in 2008 the EC extended the final date of eligibility 
for the 2000-06 OPs to ensure the maximum use of all CP resources from the 2000-06 period. 
Challenges were also encountered in the closure of specific types of project. In many 
programmes, the main concern was that too many uncompleted projects would remain at the 
time of closure and there was a focus on ensuring the timely closure of individual projects. 
Certain types of projects were seen as potentially most problematical. Notably, there was 
concern that MPs risk not being completed on time (e.g. Germany, Greece). Difficulties emerged 
because of unforeseen delays or weaknesses in estimating the time needed for administering 
large and complex projects. Moreover, if a MP could not be completed, it was often difficult to 
find appropriate alternatives for relatively large amounts of funds. 
 
There was also uncertainty over human and organisational resources. Previous research 
has assessed the administrative costs involved in CP implementation, including the calculation 
of staff workloads.9 This shows that the beginning and end of each period are particularly work-
intensive due to the overlapping of activities related to the new and the old programmes. The 
transition between programming periods can be associated with staff turnover or organisational 
restructuring.10 In a number of programmes, authorities faced uncertainty in terms of 
identifying and allocating the human resources or organisational roles for closure. In some 
cases, this was due to organisational flux as authorities prepared for the 2007-13 period. Staff 
turnover and the reorganisation of management and implementation structures at national and 
regional levels raised challenges in terms of loss of experience and capacity, the collection of 
necessary documents and data etc. (e.g. Sweden, United Kingdom). These concerns were 
heightened by the broader shift of focus to the new programmes. Staff had many tasks relating 
to the preparation of the new programmes and thus less time for closure activities. Programme 
                                          
8  Davies S and Gross T (2007) The end of the formal programming period 2000-2006, IQ-Net Review Paper 19(1), 
European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
9  SWECO (2010) Regional governance in the context of globalisation - reviewing governance mechanisms & 
administrative costs. Administrative workload and costs for Member State public authorities of the implementation 
of ERDF and Cohesion Fund, report for DG Regional Policy. 
10  Gross T and Davies S (2007) Programmes in Transition - Between Closure and Start. Review of Programme 
Developments: Winter-Summer 2007, IQ-Net Review Paper 20(1). 
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closure was sometimes viewed as an activity undertaken by a small number of specialists, even 
though there was a need for a much wider range of individuals to cooperate in providing 
information and ensuring that all procedures relating to the closure of projects and programmes 
were completed on time. 
 
3URJUDPPH DXWKRULWLHV¶ H[SHULHQFHV ZLWK FORVXUH LQ -06 show that this is a very 
complicated and long-term process that often causes significant delays and risks. Assessments 
of the process in the 2000-06 period from the EC11 and the ECA12 highlighted several issues 
(see Box 1). 
Box 1: The closure process 2000-06: issues identified 
x Closure documents were prepared at the last moment 
x Insufficient number or late execution of checks 
x ,QFRPSOHWHGRFXPHQWVDQGORQJµping-SRQJ¶ between EC and the MS to obtain 
additional information 
x Disagreements with the EC over the extent and application of financial corrections 
x Overbooking to maximise receipts and to avoid net loss 
x Retrospective financing: The switching of projects initially proposed for 
implementation with EU co-funding with replacement projects. These are projects 
which have already been funded and sometimes already completed with national 
funds 
x Not enough staff allocated to closure 
x Weaknesses in public procurement 
x Delayed irregularity procedures and management 
x Delays in project implementation 
x Deficiencies of submitted winding-up documents 
x Error rates calculated wrongly by MSs 
x Quality and availability of data 
x Overlapping programming periods ± new framework set up before the old one could 
have been assessed 
x Programming periods relatively long (10 years) ± programmes and regulations need 
to be adopted several times, changes affect institutions, organisational changes and 
turnover of staff 
x Financial crisis and extension of eligibility period 
x 5% sample of eligible expenditure for checks under Art. 10 of Reg. 438/200113 
x Conclusions of on-going audits delaying the closure process 
x The lack of flexibility to address closure challenges at measure-level in OPs  
x Unfinished operations 
x Separate closure procedure for CF projects 
Source: EPRC and von Busch A (2014) Closure 2007-2013: Changes and Lessons learned from 2000-2006, 
Modifications to the closure guidelines, seminar, Lisbon 13 May 2014. 
                                          
11  von Busch A (2014) Closure 2007-2013: Changes and Lessons learned from 2000-2006, Modifications to the closure 
guidelines, seminar, Lisbon 13 May 2014. 
12  'HQFVĘ%µ7KHOHVVRQVRIWKHIinancial closure of the 2000-SHULRG¶Seminar on the experience gained 
during the winding up of the programming period 2000-2006, Budapest, 20-21 September 2012. 
https://www.asz.hu/en/seminar-on-the-experience-gained-2014-09-10. 
13  Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the management and control systems for assistance granted 
under the Structural Funds, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R0438&from=EN  
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2.1.3 Approaches to addressing these challenges 
 
Programme authorities took varying steps in relation to addressing these challenges, 
introducing a range of formal structures, resources and procedures to facilitate closure:14 
 
x Formal coordination mechanisms. A number of programme authorities set up 
working groups with the specific task of coordinating the closure of the programmes, 
sometimes at national level (e.g. the United Kingdom programme Closure Group), for 
each EU Fund (e.g. Finland) and sometimes also at regional or programme level (e.g. 
Closure Steering Groups in Lombardy, Scotland, Sweden and Wales). 
x Domestic seminars, guidelines and advice. Many national authorities organised 
seminars or workshops to inform programme managers, intermediary bodies and 
project-holders about the challenges and requirements of programme closure. Some 
national and regional authorities also drafted guidelines in addition to the EU guidelines 
(e.g. Austria, Finland). In Germany, one MA had published its own guidelines for 
partners before it had received the EC guidelines.  
x Focusing on financial monitoring, audit and control. Across MAs, work was 
undertaken to check the accuracy, consistency and reliability of data already entered 
into electronic monitoring in preparation for closure audits. Financial control and audit 
authorities were informed about the obligations associated with programme closure, and 
certification authorities were also notified about the closure steps to be undertaken.  
x The timely closure of projects. Responding to the absorption pressures and the risk 
that projects would not perform as anticipated, a number of MAs developed lists of 
UHVHUYH SURMHFWV µRYHUERRNLQJ¶ IXQGV XQGHU FHUWDLQ 23 SULRULWLHV RU PHDVXUHV
Programme authorities also looked to shift funds within the programme in order to 
ensure that resources were fully absorbed by the deadline for spending (e.g. Finland). 
Other steps to ensure financial absorption included: efforts to persuade the EC to change 
its approach to the treatment of domestic private and public co-financing (e.g. Austria); 
the identification and targeting of problematic projects for particular attention and 
support; and setting deadlines for project-holders to report on project completion and 
many targeted potentially problematic projects.  
2.2 Analytical Framework 
Three key variables emerge from the assessment of the closure process: financial absorption, 
types of intervention and governance and administration issues. In order to inform the 
analysis of closure in 2007-13, the following section takes each of these three variables, 
develops a hypothesis of how they can influence closure processes (see Figure 4). 
                                          
14  Davies S and Gross T (2007) The end of the formal programming period 2000-2006, IQ-Net Review Paper 19(1), 
European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow. 
Lessons learnt from the Closure of the 2007-13 Programming Period 
 
 
13 
Figure 4: Determining factors of closure  
 
Source: EPRC. 
2.2.1 Financial absorption 
 
The first variable impacting on the closure process is financial absorption. A basic hypothesis is 
that the quality of the closure process is determined by pressures on OPs to absorb EU 
funds. Fundamentally, closure requires efficient absorption of the EU funds available under an 
OP. Ideally, by the end of 2013, programmes aim to be reaching 100% or more of funds fully 
committed to operations. In reality, coordinating the achievement of absorption targets and 
the implementation of closure processes is challenging. For instance, at the end of programming 
periods MSs can look to correct the impact of irregular spending several years after the event. 
In order to effect corrections without risking a reduction in the funding envelope, MSs have to 
find a sufficient number of eligible projects in the final years of the programming period.15 There 
is an argument that programme authorities will put less emphasis on the full implementation 
of closure tasks (reporting and recording of results, ensuring sound financial management, 
preparation of closure documents) in order to ensure 100% absorption of the available funds. 
A range of factors can intervene to delay or skew financial absorption, influencing the closure 
process.  
x Closure can be particularly challenging for MSs with large programmes,16 programmes 
with complex implementation arrangements17 or where errors or irregularities have 
delayed implementation.  
x 0RUHRYHU SURJUDPPH DXWKRULWLHV¶ DSSURDFKHV WR GHDOLQJ ZLWK DEVRUSWLRQ SUHVVXUHV
such as the phasing of projects into the next programming period, the use of 
retrospective projects that have already been supported, often by domestic funds (see 
Section 4.1.3) all have implications for the implementation of closure.  
                                          
15  Gross T and Davies S (2007) Programmes in Transition - Between Closure and Start. Review of Programme 
Developments: Winter-Summer 2007, IQ-Net Review Paper 20(1). 
16  European Parliament (2013) The (low) absorption of EU Structural Funds, Library Briefing, Library of the European 
Parliament 01/10/2013. 
17  Gross T and Davies S (2007) Op. cit. 
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x µOverbooking¶ SURMHFWV WR FUHDWH D VXUSOXV RI SURMHFWV DSSURYHG XQGHU VSHFLILF
programme priorities (see Section 3.2.1) is a common means for programme authorities 
to build flexibility into resource allocation arrangements in the event of absorption 
pressures during implementation. However, at closure there is a risk that pressure 
increases on programme authorities to identify alternative sources of funding for any 
approved projects for which there are no more EU funds available. 
2.2.2 Type of operation 
 
The second variable that can have an impact on the closure process concerns specific 
operations included in OPs. Some types of intervention are inevitably more challenging to 
implement and to close. This can be due to their size or complexity. Some types of operation 
have a special status that is accompanied by specific procedures and guidance that complicate 
implementation and closure, particularly where programme authorities have limited experience. 
Specific examples include: 
 
x Financial Engineering Instruments (FEIs). FEIs represent around 5% of the ERDF 
resources in the programming period 2007-13. The innovative revolving funds are 
relatively new and their management and control poses challenges for programme 
authorities whose OPs have incorporated these types of intervention, in terms of the 
calculation of eligible expenditure, management costs and fees at closure, the 
implementation of investment activities beyond the closure deadline for eligible 
expenditure, dealing with legacy issues (residual funds) etc. At the transition of the 
programming periods, the FEI implementation organisations need to make sure that the 
running instruments work effectively, to ensure their proper financial management and 
be aware of audit procedures. 
 
x Revenue-generating projects. Investments in infrastructure can be subject to 
charges borne directly by users or any operation involving the sale or rent of land or 
buildings or the provision of services against payment. This could include projects based 
on public-private partnerships. Here the closure challenge lies in making a final 
calculation of revenue generated, given potential lack of data or unforeseeable demand 
after closure. Some MSs might face difficulties with revenue-generating projects at the 
point of programme closure, when deficiencies in appraisal may become apparent in the 
absence of guidance on how to calculate the revenue.18 
 
x Major projects. Requiring EC approval following Articles 39-41 of the General 
Regulation, MPs involve a significant block of funding and often entail challenging public 
procurement procedures that can cause delays during implementation. Given the scale 
of programme resources involved and the risk of non-completion, the closure of such 
projects can be critical to the successful implementation and closure of some OPs. 
2.2.3 Administrative capacity and governance 
 
The final variable concerns the quality of the closure process is determined by the 
administrative capacity and governance approaches of programme authorities. 
Research and policy evaluation over the past decade has concluded that the variable 
performance of CP is partly associated with deficiencies in administrative capacity and, 
specifically, problems faced by institutions in the MSs in managing and implementing the Funds 
                                          
18  Kah S (2011) A snapshot of the present and a glimpse of the future of Cohesion policy: Review of Programme 
Implementation, Summer-Autumn 2011, IQ-Net Thematic Paper 29(1), European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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in line with the regulatory requirements.19 This includes the programme closure process. For 
MAs and IBs in particular, there is a substantial list of actions to be taken as part of the 
programme closure process and it is worth noting that different programmes take different 
approaches, depending on existing administrative arrangements and capacities, the size and 
scope of programmes etc. Research has identified three main components considered 
fundamental in creating the conditions for the effective and efficient management of CP,20 and 
these can be applied to programme closure tasks:21 
 
x Structures: a clear assignment of responsibilities and tasks to institutions, specifically 
at the level of departments with programme responsibilities.  
x Human resources: the ability to detail tasks and responsibilities at the level of job 
description; estimate the number and qualifications of staff and fulfil the recruitment 
needs; timely availability of experienced, skilled and motivated staff.22  
x Systems and tools: the availability of instruments (methods, guidelines, manuals, 
etc.) that can enhance the effectiveness of the functioning of the system. 
  
                                          
19  %DFKWOHU-0HQGH]&DQG2UDåH+µ)URPFRQditionality to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe: 
5HJLRQDOSROLF\SHUIRUPDQFHDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFDSDFLW\¶(XURSHDQ3ODQQLQJ6WXGLHV 
20  1RWDEO\XQGHUWKH(,%¶V(,%856LQLWLDWLYHVHHhttp://www.eprc-eiburs.eu/. 
21  Research carried out in the context of the IQ-Net network of SF programme authorities, see 
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/iqnet/, Michie R and Granqvist K (2013) Managing the 2007-13 programmes towards 
full absorption and closure. Review of programme implementation, Winter 2012-Spring 2013, IQ-Net Review Paper 
32(1), European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
22  European Parliament (2013) Op cit. 
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3. CLOSURE IN 2007-13: REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Responding to experiences from programme closure in 2000-06, regulatory 
provisions were introduced as well as guidance and support for 2007-13. Besides 
setting the overall regulatory framework and timetable, the EC introduced 
specific provisions that directly addressed issues related to the key variables 
identified in the research. Provisions to ensure timely and regular spending 
included: 10% flexibility in spending between Priority Axes, and the potential to 
µRYHUERRN¶DQGµSKDVH¶SURMHFWVProvisions and guidelines to deal with specific 
types of operation covered: major projects, FEIs, non-functioning projects and 
revenue-generating projects. Provisions and other initiatives related to 
governance and administrative capacity concerned the strengthened role of 
Audit Authorities and a range of measures to encourage a proactive approach 
to closure at EU level. 
 
3.1 Regulatory framework and timetable 
Closure requirements were set out in General Regulation 1083/200623 and in its amendment, 
regulation 1297/2013.24 In addition to these, the EC adopted closure guidelines on 20 March 
2013 after a 14-month period of drafting and consultation.25 These guidelines responded to the 
experiences and issues raised by EU and MS authorities from the closure process in 2000-06 
and have been replaced by an amended version on 30 April 2015.26 
 
Overall, there are 322 ERDF and CF OPs to close. The key dates in the closure process are 31 
December 2015 (Article 56(1) General Regulation), which is the final date for the eligibility of 
expenditure by beneficiaries and 31 March 2017, which is the final date for the submission of 
closure documents (see Table 3 and Figure 5 below). At the end of January 2017, only one of 
322 ERDF and CF had been closed (Gibraltar) and less than 50 MAs had started to enter closure 
GDWD LQWR WKH(&¶V6)& V\VWHP.27 Yet, DG REGIO expressed its intentions to apply the 
deadlines strictly, except in cases of procedural force majeure. Any documents submitted after 
the deadline will be disregarded and the last document provided during programme 
implementation will be used instead, i.e. the last versions of the Annual Implementation Report 
(AIR) and Annual Control Report and the last interim payment claim. The outstanding balance 
                                          
23  Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1083&from=en  
24  Regulation (EU) No 1297/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 as regards certain provisions relating to financial management for certain 
Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, to the 
decommitment rules for certain Member States, and to the rules on payments of the final balance, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:347:0253:0255:EN:PDF  
25  European Commission (2013) Commission Decision of 20.3.2013 on the approval of guidelines on the closure of 
operational programmes adopted for assistance from the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (2007-2013), C(2013) 1573 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/guidelines/closure_2007_2013/guidelines_closure_2
0072013_en.pdf 
26  European Commission (2015a) ANNEX to the Commission Decision amending Decision C(2013) 1573 on the 
approval of the guidelines on the closure of operational programmes adopted for assistance from the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (2007-2013), C(2015) 2771 final, 
ANNEX 1, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2015/EN/3-2015-2771-EN-F1-1-ANNEX-1.PDF  
27  6)&LVWKH(&¶VV\VWHPIRUHOHFWURQLFH[FKDQJHRIGDWDFRQFHUQLQJVKDUHG)XQGPDQDJHPHQWEHWZHHQ06V
and the EC for 2007-13. Amongst others, it covers ERDF, ESF, CF and the rural and fisheries funds. See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/sfc/en/2007  
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on the programme would be decommitted. OPs are closed by the payment of the final 
balance (Article 89 General Regulation) and supporting documents must be available for at 
least three years following the date of closure (Article 90 General Regulation). 
Table 3: Timetable for closure 2007-13 
Date Action 
31 December 2015 
Deadline for final eligibility for expenditure. Article 56(1) General 
Regulation 
30 June 2016 
Deadline recommended for the submission of the last interim 
payment to EC 
31 December 2016 
Deadline recommended for the CA to submit to the AA application for 
payment of final balance and final statement of expenditure 
31 March 2017 
Final date for the submission of closure documents 
State aid - final date for the body granting the aid to pay the public 
contribution to the State aid beneficiaries 
31 March 2018 Global objective for the EC to close as many OPs as possible 
31 March 2019 Deadline for the final reporting on non-functional projects 
3 years after 
closure of 
programme 
All supporting documents regarding expenditure and audits on the 
programme concerned are kept available for the EC and the ECA 
Article 90 General Regulation 
No time limit 
Report on pending recoveries and operations suspended due to legal or 
administrative proceedings 
Source: Regulations and European Commission (2015a) Op. cit. 
 
The EC revisions of the guidelines in 2015 aligned them with regulatory changes made by the 
Council and EP at the end of 2013 and simplified some closure procedures. The closure process 
involves shutting down the operation of a programme, finalising the proper reporting and 
recording of results, and ensuring the sound financial management necessary when dealing 
with public funds. This includes the preparation of a series of documents for each OP that 
WRJHWKHUIRUPWKHµclosure package¶ an application for payment of the final balance, a FIR 
and a closure declaration. The preparation of the package required contributions by three main 
programme management bodies in the MSs: MAs, CAs and AAs. In this process, each 
body had distinct responsibilities and a range of complementary tasks (see Table 4 below). It 
should be noted that, in principle, programme Monitoring Committees have a role to play in the 
closure process and the progress of closure procedures are on MC meeting agendas in the final 
years of programmes. However, MC tasks in this respect are largely formal, notably: the 
approval of FIRs by written procedures before their submission. 
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Figure 5: EC closure arrangements 2007-13 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and rural development programmes.
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Table 4: The closure process: administrative responsibilities 
Body Managing Authority Certifying Authority Audit Authority 
Closure package 
element 
Final Implementation 
Report (FIR) 
Application for payment of 
the final balance and a 
certified statement of 
expenditure 
Closure declaration, 
supported by a final 
control report 
Legal basis Art. 67 General Regulation 
and Annex XVIII to the 
Implementing Regulation28 
Art. 89 General 
Regulation and Annex X to 
the Implementing 
Regulation 
Art. 61 General 
Regulation and Annex 
VIII to the 
Implementing 
Regulation 
Individual steps Check the final 
expenditure claims from 
beneficiaries 
Complete management 
verifications 
Ensure reconciliation 
between final statement of 
expenditure and 
accounting records and 
audit trail down to the 
final recipient 
Verify amount of public 
contribution paid or due to 
be paid 
Verify that 
errors/irregularities 
stemming from all 
available verifications and 
audits (management 
checks, system audits/on 
operations audits, other 
national bodies, EU bodies 
audits) were corrected  
Verify correspondence of 
the financial information 
included in the final 
statement of expenditure 
and in the final 
implementation report, 
including list of operations 
suspended 
Prepare FIR, following the 
same structure as AIRs, 
presenting aggregated 
data and information for 
the whole implementing 
period 
Ensure that it receives all 
necessary information 
from MA and on all audit 
results 
Satisfy itself that all 
errors/irregularities were 
corrected, that recovered 
amounts are repaid and 
all audit findings and 
recommendations 
implemented 
Draw up the application 
for final balance and the 
final statement of 
expenditure 
Draw up the final 
statement on withdrawals 
and recovered/pending 
recoveries/irrecoverable 
amounts 
Draw up annex to the 
statement of expenditure 
on FEIs and State aid 
Complete audit work on 
system audits and 
audits on operations on 
the expenditure 
declared in 2015 and 
2016 
Verify that MA, IBs, CA 
work for closure is 
complete and reliable in 
particular on 
management 
verifications, 
errors/irregularities, 
information on the 
follow up given to audit 
results 
Draw up the final 
control report and 
closure declaration on 
the validity of the 
payment declaration 
and legality and 
regularity of the 
underlying transactions 
Source: EPRC and Soumela M (2014) General principles and the Guidelines on the closure of operational 
programmes 2007-2013, seminar, Lisbon 13 May 2014. 
 
At the end of January 2017, i.e. two months before the deadline, reminder letters were sent 
out to all MAs. 6XEPLVVLRQRIWKHFORVXUHSDFNDJHKDGWREHGRQHYLDWKH(&¶V6)&SODWIRUP
by end of March 2017. The EC provided extensive guidance on how to do this and how to 
                                          
28  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards record-keeping obligations for investment firms, transaction reporting, 
market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and defined terms for the purposes of that 
Directive, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1287&from=EN  
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complete its constituent documents.29 After submission, the EC has five months (i.e. until 
August 2017) from the date of the receipt of the FIR to respond to the MS (Art. 67(5) 
General Regulation). If it fails to respond within the time limit, the report is considered to be 
accepted. In its response, the EC either confirms its admissibility or provides comments in case 
it is not satisfied with its content and asks for it to be revised. The FIR will only be accepted if 
all the comments from the EC have been addressed.  
 
Important differences introduced for 2007-13 included: 
x No extension of periods for eligible expenditure or closure deadlines. The 
extension of the period of eligible spending and the deadline for submission of winding-
up reports in 2000-06 (in order to maximise the scope for absorption in the context of 
the financial crisis) had complicated the closure process. For 2007-13, the final date of 
eligibility and deadline for submission of closure documents were fixed in the General 
Regulation: no extensions were possible (although there were exceptions to the final 
dates of eligibility for spending in specific types of operation such as MPs and FEIs).  
 
x The integration of CF and ERDF closure procedures. In 2000-06 there were 
individual closure procedures for CF projects. In 2007-13, the CF has been 
mainstreamed and the closure of CF projects is addressed as part of programme closure. 
3.2 Specific provisions  
3.2.1 Provisions to ensure timely and regular spending 
 
x 10% flexibility between Priority Axes: This allows a programme to overspend 10% 
in a particular Priority Axis without formally amending the OP, provided it is 
compensated by an equivalent reduction in another Priority Axis of the same OP. 
However, this has to be carried out before the end of the eligibility period, i.e. before 
31 December 2015. The 10% flexibility option had already been in place in 2000-06, 
but had originally been excluded for 2007-13. After MS concerns, the option had been 
reintroduced in the amended version of the General Regulation 1297/2013 of 11 
December 2013. 
 
x Overbooking: The EC services have on several occasions encouraged MAs to consider 
overbooking (i.e. the development of a project pipeline that is bigger in volume than the 
financial scope of the programme) to promote the full absorption of funds and to create 
DILQDQFLDOµEXIIHU¶RUUHVHUYHOLVWRISURMHFWVLQFDVHWKHUHDUHVXEVHTXHQWFXWV+RZHYHU
this creates the risk that any approved projects for which there are no more funds 
available must be financed domestically. 
 
x Phasing of projects: MPs and projects with a total cost of more than EUR 5 million can 
be split across two programming periods. If the projects have two clearly identifiable 
phases from a physical and financial point of view, they can be phased from the 2007-
13 period into the 2014-20 period. MS have to quantify the total amounts of phased 
projects in their FIR, but do have to provide a list of such projects only upon request. 
 
Of particular importance are audit aspects to ensure that any irregularities are not delaying 
financial absorption.  
 
                                          
29  For detailed guidance and FAQs on how to submit closure documents via SFC2007 see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/sfc/en/2007/support-materials  
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x An annual audit process for programmes. Annual audit results must be reported to the 
EC as part of the annual discharge of the budget (i.e. the final approval of the 
implementation of the budget for a specific year, following the audit and the finalisation of 
the annual accounts). In 2000-06, MS had to carry out regular audits but they only had to 
report WRWKH(&DWFORVXUHWKURXJKWKHµZLQGLQJXS¶GHFODUDWLRQV7KLVDSSURDFKGHOD\HGWKH
closure process as there was limited time to deal with serious issues at the end of the 
programming period. Having annual audit reporting reduces the scope for surprises: 
irregularities should be declared and dealt with on an annual basis. In the past, assurance 
was provided by the closure process. Now there is annual assurance and closure is the final 
opportunity to settle things. The EC now has good knowledge of the situation in each OP, 
with an annual indicator of error rates.  
 
x An error rate based on a statistical sampling of operations every year. In 2000-06, 
this assessment of error rates was done on a risk basis (i.e. with audits targeting those 
projects assessed to be most at risk of error). However, this did not give an accurate, 
representative picture of overall risk in a programme. There have been increasing 
suspensions and interruptions in the 2007-13 period because of this stronger annual audit 
assessments of OPs: around 50% of OPs have been subject to these actions. However, this 
means that problems are being dealt with on an ongoing basis rather than accumulating at 
closure.  
 
x Calculating the residual risk rate at closure. The residual risk rate is an estimate of the 
part of the cumulative expenditure declared, for each programme during the entire 
programming period, which is not legal and regular. The residual risk rate takes account of 
all financial corrections implemented since the start of the period and the total expenditure 
declared at closure. Additional work should be envisaged by AA at closure on the need to 
confirm representativeness of error rates reported and cleaning up of information on 
expenditure declared in the Annual Control Reports. 
 
x The single audit procedure. Where so-called Article 73 status (General Regulation) has 
been granted to an OP, the EC will be able to draw assurance that the final payment is legal 
and regular from the work of the AA rather than carrying out its own detailed checks. 
However, the ECA has noted the risk that the closure process may not effectively ensure 
that expenditure finally charges to the EU budget is legal and regular.30 Based on 
assessments of the closure of the 2000-06 period, the ECA has pointed out that a key 
element of the success of closure is the reliability of the closure documents (including a final 
error rate for the programme) and WKH(&¶VFKHFNVRIWKRVHGRFXPHQWV31 
3.2.2 Provisions and guidelines to deal with specific types of operation  
 
There are specific provisions for certain types of operations. 
 
x Major projects. The identification and submission of new MPs was cited by the Task Force 
for Better Implementation (TFBI) as a means of improving absorption and facilitating 
closure. The guidelines included provisions for a project to be implemented in two phases 
over two programming periods in order to complete the project without compromising its 
overall scope and avoiding incomplete (non-eligible) projects with the first phase ready to 
be used for its purpose/function by the deadline of the submission of closure documents. 
One of the findings of the TFBI was that a common cause for implementation delays and 
                                          
30  European Court of Auditors (2013) Taking VWRFNRI µVLQJOHDXGLW¶DQG WKH&RPPLVVLRQ
V UHOLDQFHRQ WKHZRUNRI
national audit authorities in cohesion, Special Report No 16. 
31  European Court of Auditors (2012) Annual Report of the European Court of Auditors for the 2011 financial year, 
Chapter 5 (Cohesion) 6HFWLRQ$µ$VVHVVPHQWRIFORVXUHIRUWKH-2006 programming period. 
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threats to the closure process was insufficient preparation for complex infrastructure 
projects: In the case of large infrastructure projects, the closure procedures are more 
complex, involving additional checks on the project before the final payment can be made.32 
 
x FEIs. The closure guidelines introduced a number of additional reporting requirements for 
FEIs for the FIR (information on withdrawals of programme resources from FEI; amount of 
capitalised interest rate subsidies and guarantee fee subsidies; interest generated by 
payments from the programme and attributable to the SF; information on legacy, including 
value of legacy resources attributable to ERDF/ESF resources and the date of winding up 
and accrual of legacy). The additional information to be provided requires changes to be 
made to the SFC2007 reporting module.33 FEIs can continue to invest in the real economy 
throughout 2016, i.e. beyond the final date of eligibility of 31 December 2015. For the MA 
to have enough time to prepare a complete final report and for the audit authority to have 
sufficient time to carry out its work for the closure declaration, the EC recommends that 
remaining investments in final recipients should take place well in advance of the deadline 
of 31 March 2017.  
 
x Non-functioning projects. The closure guidelines also made provision for the treatment 
RI µQRQ-IXQFWLRQLQJ¶ SURMHFWV GHILQHG DV either a non-completed project or a project 
completed but not in use. MSs could on a case-by-case basis include expenditure paid for 
non-functioning projects in the final statement of expenditure. The total cost of each of 
these projects had to be at least EUR 5 million; and the EU contribution to these non-
functioning projects could not be more than 10% of the total allocation for the OP. 
 
x The guidelines included provisions for other types of operation with specific challenges, 
notably revenue-generating projects. The guidelines covered the estimation of revenue 
in advance Article 55 and deductions required at closure.  
 
3.2.3 Provisions and other initiatives related to governance and administrative 
capacity 
The regulatory provisions directly related to governance and administration were limited. 
However, the strengthened role of AAs had significant implications for closure, as a dedicated 
body in charge of OP auditing activities has been institutionalised (Article 62 General 
Regulation).34 AAs received a status similar to those of MAs but are independent from them. 
They moved closer to OP implementation process than before. In this context, the introduction 
of annual control reports has significantly simplified procedures. MSs should no longer 
declare irregularities at closure, but these should be declared and dealt with on an annual basis. 
Since there has to be assurance about the regularity of all spending before programmes can 
close, there remains the risk that last minute certification of expenditure will create more 
closure work and delay the process. In fact, DG REGIO expected last minute certification to 
happen and that auditors would be looking at the spending in some programmes after the end 
of March 2017. 
A provision aimed at facilitating closure procedures is the option of partial closure. OPs can 
be partially closed at periods to be determined by the MS, relating to operations completed 
                                          
32  European Commission (2016b) Task Force promotes better use of EU funding, DG REGIO Newsroom item 31 March 
2016, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2016/03/31-03-2016-task-force-promotes-better-
use-of-eu-funding  
33  European Commission (2016c) Summary of data on the progress made in financing and implementing financial 
engineering instruments reported by the managing authorities in accordance with Article 67(2)(j) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, Programming period 2007-2013. Situation as at 31 December 2015. DG Regional 
and Urban Policy, September 2016. 
34  Davies S, Gross F and Polverari L (2008) The Financial Management, Control and Audit of EU Cohesion Policy: 
Contrasting Views on Challenges, Idiosyncrasies and the Way Ahead, IQ-Net Thematic Paper 23(2), European 
Policies Research Centre, Glasgow.  
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during the period up to 31 December of the previous year. This can cover specific operations 
in a programme and can be performed once or several times during the programming period 
for the same programme, providing the necessary procedures and documentation are fulfilled 
(Article 88 General Regulation). 
 
In the context of ensuring an efficient closure process, it is important to note that he EC adopted 
a proactive approach to the closure of the 2007-13 programming period, with an increased 
focus on training and capacity-building. Hence, DG REGIO is confident that closure will be dealt 
with more efficiently compared to the past. It set out objectives for closure procedures in its 
management plan for 2016, including targets for payments to MSs and for the timely adoption 
of modifications of MPs.35 It also set itself the internal target of 31 March 2018, i.e. to have 
the closure documents accepted within one year of their receipt.36 
 
The key elements put in place by the EC to ensure efficient closure procedures are: 
 
x A dedicated Closure Unit (Unit F.1) in DG REGIO, which is also one of five so-called 
Competence Centres in the DG.37 The Closure Unit coordinates the closure procedures 
and provides overall support for MS authorities on closure issues. This allowed the 
concentration of closure capacities, including experienced staff involved in closure of 
past programming periods. The decision to do so was based on lessons learned from 
2000-06, when closure tasks were spread across different units.  
x A so-called closure matrix across the DG that is based around the Competence Centre 
concept and combines staff tasks in geographical units with time spent ± usually 10% ± 
in the dedicated Closure Unit. 
x A three-part internal manual for closure procedures has been prepared by the 
Closure Unit for DG REGIO staff, looking at the three elements of the closure package. 
It is mainly targeted at desk officers in the geographical units who will be responsible 
for closure for their countries.  
x There are internal training courses for DG REGIO staff organised between January 
and June 2017. These consist of three modules, looking at the three parts of the closure 
package. 
x A series of 20 closure seminars covering 28 MSs in the run-up to closure in 2013, 
resulting in a questions and answers document available online.38 
 
Also, the TFBI initiative set up in 2014 delivered a range of capacity-building exercises for 
eight MSs targeted (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia), including seminars, workshops and technical meetings with national authorities. The 
TFBI developed action plans for each of these MSs, including adjustments in a number of 
programme and project timetables. Some projects were phased over two programming periods, 
which means they can now be implemented fully during 2014-20.  
 
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKLV'*5(*,2¶V&RPSHWHQFH&HQWUH$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&DSDFLW\%XLOGLQJKDVEHHQ
encouraging the exchange of experiences via its TAIEX-REGIO PEER 2 PEER initiative (see 
Box 2). 
                                          
35  DG Regional and Urban Policy (2016c) Management Plan 2016, 1 April 2016, p. 15. 
36  European Commission (2013) Q&A on the 2007-2013 programmes closure, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/guidelines/closure_2007_2013/qa_closure20072013
_en.pdf 
37  7KHRWKHUIRXUDUHµ,QFOXVLYH*URZWK8UEDQDQG7HUULWRULDO'HYHORSPHQW¶'µ0DFUR-Regions, Transnational, 
,QWHUUHJLRQDO&RRSHUDWLRQ,3$(QODUJHPHQW¶(µ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH&DSDFLW\%XLOGLQJDQG(XURSHDQ6ROLGDULW\)XQG¶
DQG*µ6PDUWDQG6XVWDLQDEOH*URZWK¶ 
38  European Commission (2013) Q&A on the 2007-2013 programmes closure, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/guidelines/closure_2007_2013/qa_closure20072013
_en.pdf  
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Box 2'*5(*,2¶V7$,(;-REGIO PEER 2 PEER initiative 
The TAIEX-REGIO PEER 2 PEER is a DG REGIO initiative that can contribute to closure 
capacity. The initiative involves  
a) expert missions where MS experts can be sent to institutions in other MSs that 
have requested peer advice and exchange of experience on a specific topic;  
b) study visits where participants from a requesting institution can be sent on a 
working visit to other MS institutions to learn from peers and exchange good 
practices; and  
c) single or multi-country workshops organised in a requesting institution.  
So far, there have been 74 events (end of January 2017), of which two have been on 
closure: 
x 8-9 February 2016, Zagreb (Croatia): Expert mission with 35 participants and 
experts from the Ministry of Regional Development in Romania and from the 
Ministry of Finance in Latvia.39 
x 10-11 October 2016, Vilnius (Lithuania): Study visit involving four participants from 
the OP Prague (Czech Republic) visiting the Ministry of Finance in Lithuania.40 
A new initiative from Competence Centre Administrative Capacity Building plans to build 
in the peer-to-SHHUDSSURDFKZLWKµ&RPPXQLWLHVRI3UDFWLWLRQHUV¶ 
Source: EC interviews, January 2017. For more information on TAIEX-REGIO PEER 2 PEER see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/improving-investment/taiex-regio-peer-2-peer/  
 
Communication between MSs or programme authorities and DG REGIO is channelled through 
the desk officers responsible for the specific programme. These then direct all requests they 
cannot deal with directly to other units, e.g. the Closure Unit for closure issues. For the last 6-
12 months before the closure deadline these desk officers have been active in supporting MS 
authorities to get ready for closure. 
 
In terms of audit, DG REGIO has organised regular technical meetings with AAs in MSs to 
share experiences gained on different aspects of assurance building. This process is designed 
to strengthen the accountability of MSs in the audit process over the programming period (e.g. 
through the description and assessment of management and control systems at the outset of 
the period, various levels of controls at national and programme levels during implementation 
and a final control report in the closure package). For instance, topics covered in meetings in 
2010 and 2011 include evaluation of the compliance assessment exercise, specific issues in 
relation to systems audits and audits of operations, audit approach to FEIs and additional 
guidance on treatment of errors and reporting in annual control reports and audit opinions. This 
process has included country-specific meetings with AAs (e.g. in Italy, Spain and the Czech 
Republic) to address selected issues.  
 
,QDGGLWLRQDQQXDOµHomologues Group meetings¶RIQDWLRQDODQGEC audit representatives 
have become a useful tool to strengthen co-ordination, exchange best audit practices and 
jointly reflect on future needs. Recent topics include audit methods on public procurement, 
FEIs, fraud prevention and State aid. Of particular relevance was the Homologues Group 
meeting in Riga in September 2015, where 157 participants discussed issues linked mainly to 
the closure of the 2007-13 programming period. This included clarifications to AAs on the 
methodology to calculate the residual risk rate at closure. 
                                          
39 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/dyn/taiex-events/library/detail_en.jsp?EventID=60709  
40 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/dyn/taiex-events/library/detail_en.jsp?EventID=62762  
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A survey of MS authorities conducted by the ECA indicated a rough split between those that 
saw benefits and those who saw disadvantages iQWKH(&¶VSURYLVLRQVDVFRPSDUed to 2000-06 
(see Figure 6).41 Almost all the authorities participating in the survey considered that the EC 
provided the guidelines sufficiently ahead of time to prepare for closure and most found the 
EC¶VWUDLQLQJDQGVXSSRUWWREHXVHIXO. Nonetheless, there were still some uncertainties, related 
to; whether the verification of the achievement of OP targets should be included in closure 
declarations; calculation of residual error rate and consequences if it is above the materiality 
threshold (2%); and, the treatment of FEIs, non-functioning projects and revenue-generating 
projects. 
Figure 6: MS approval of EC support for closure 2007-13, compared to 2000-06 
 
Source: European Court of Auditors (2017a) p. 49. 
 
 
  
                                          
41  European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and 
rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016, p. 49. 
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4. MEMBER STATE EXPERIENCES 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The research indicates that financial absorption pressures have an impact on 
the efficiency of the closure process. Programme authorities have taken measures 
to balance the demands of effective absorption and efficient closure but, generally, a 
focus on the former has put pressure on the latter. In some cases, it is arguable that 
these tensions have had an impact on the strategic quality of OPs.  
 The implementation of certain types of intervention has had implications for 
the quality of the closure process. This applies particularly to FEIs and MPs, although 
there are also issues relating to non-functioning projects. EU provisions and MS actions 
have attempted to address the problems associated with dealing with these 
interventions at closure but challenges remain, largely related to uncertainties in 
regulations and guidance and in some cases limitations in capacity and experience.  
 Across MSs, the quality of the closure process has been determined by the 
administrative capacity and governance approaches of programme authorities. 
Efficient programme closure has relied on the coordinated input of actors and structures 
at EU, national and programme levels at a time when administrative resources are 
constrained or in flux as a result of the launch of OPs for the next programming period. 
MSs have developed different approaches to address these tensions. 
 
From 2013, different components of closure preparation could be identified among MSs, most 
commonly domestic closure guidelines or internal closure deadlines. These preparations 
HYROYHGDWGLIIHUHQWUDWHVDµVQDSVKRW¶RIFORVXUHSUHSDUDWLRQVDWWKHHQGRILQDVHOHFWLRQ
of MSs illustrates this variation (see Figure 7).   
Figure 7: Closure preparations in IQ-Net programmes at the end of 201342 
 
Source: Vironen H, Michie R and Granqvist K (2013) Focusing on preparing the new programmes ± state of play with 
2014-20 and 2007-13 programmes, IQ-Net Review Paper 33(1), European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow, p. 25.  
                                          
42  ENG = England (UK), N-W = North Rhine-Westphalia (DE), S-A = Saxony-Anhalt (DE), SCO = Scotland (UK), VL = 
Flanders (BE), WAL = Wales (UK). 
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The evolution of these responses to closure, and their efficiency, were conditioned by different 
factors: financial absorption pressures (Section 4.1), types of operation (Section 4.2) and 
governance and administration (Section 4.3). 
4.1 Closure and financial absorption pressures 
4.1.1 Variation in financial absorption  
 
There is considerable variation in absorption patterns across MSs. After a slow start to 
the 2007-13 period, most programmes caught up in terms of financial absorption.43 
Nevertheless, as a result of these variables, the spending profile of programmes in different 
MSVYDULHVFRQVLGHUDEO\$EVRUSWLRQGDWDE\\HDU(5')WRIURPWKH(&¶VGDWDEDVH
allows the identification of four different types of MSs, according to the pace and timing 
of spending (excluding Croatia).  
 
*URXSµearly absorbers¶LQFOXGLQJDURXQGKDOIWKHMSs (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Sweden) had absorbed the bulk of their funding relatively early in the period (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8: ERDF absorption 2007-13 ± *URXSµHDUO\DEVRUEHUV¶ 
 
Source: EC, ESI Funds Open Data Platform, see https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
These 14 countries had already high absorption in 2013 (65-79%) and achieved a very high 
absorption by 2016 (94-95%, Greece 100%). The absorption curve has been flattening out 
from 2014. 
 
Some MSV*URXSRIµmedium absorbers¶VDZDVWHHSLQFUHDVHLQDEVRUSWLRQLQ-15, 
but from a reasonable base of financial performance (see Figure 9). 
                                          
43  European Commission (2016a) Ex post evaluation of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund 2007-13, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SWD(2016) 318 final, 19 September 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2013/wp1_synthesis_report_en.pdf  
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Figure 9: ERDF absorption 2007-13 ± *URXSµPHGLXPDEVRUEHUVµ 
 
Source: EC, ESI Funds Open Data Platform, see https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
These four countries (France, Hungary, Latvia and Spain) had reasonable absorption levels in 
2013 (60-65%), followed by a steep increase of absorption 2013-15, before flattening out to 
high or very high absorption in 2016 (91-95%). 
 
A third category of MSs started at a much lower level of absorption in 2013 (48-55%). But 
*URXSSURGXFHGDQDFFHOHUDWHGDEVRUSWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHLQDQGVRWRµFDWFKXS¶
with other MSs (see Figure 10). With the exception of Malta (88%), these countries managed 
to achieve very high absorption (95%) in 2016. 
Figure 10: ERDF absorption 2007-13 ± *URXSµODWHDEVRUEHUV¶ 
 
Source: EC, ESI Funds Open Data Platform, see https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
A final category of MSVµYHU\ODWHDEVRUEHUV¶LQFOXGHVILYHMSs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Italy, 
Romania, Slovakia). Group 4 started from low (57% in Slovakia) or very low levels (37% in 
Romania) in 2013, but achieved good absorption by 2016 (89-95%) mainly due to accelerated 
performance in 2014 and 2015 (see Figure 11). The progress was steady in some MSs (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic), but uneven in others. 
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Figure 11: ERDF absorption 2007-13 ± *URXSµYHU\ODWHDEVRUEHUV¶ 
 
Source: EC, ESI Funds Open Data Platform, see https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
Programme suspensions or decommitments inevitably put pressure on closure processes. For 
the 2007-13 period, pressure on financial performance was increased by the late agreement 
on the EU's Multi-Annual Financial Framework for the same period, and consequent delays in 
the negotiations of the NSRFs (National Strategic Reference Frameworks) and the OPs. 
Moreover, the late start of the programmes then coincided with the economic and financial 
crisis. The EC has responded to funding pressures in specific countries by introducing 
amendments that have an impact on closure processes, e.g. through the TFBI initiative (see 
Section 3.2.3). 
 
The EC also extended the decommitment rule WRµ1¶LQ5RPDQLDDQG6ORYDNLDFRYHULQJ
2011 and 2012 commitments, to facilitate absorption and in Greece it approved the early 
release of the last 5% of remaining EU payments, (normally retained until after the closure of 
the programmes) to increase the funding available in 2015 and 2016. 
 
In all case study OPs, the N+2/3 rule was found to be of benefit as a motivation for regular 
spending and for closure, working to limit absorption concerns towards the end of the period. 
The extension of the decommitment rule in some MSs was largely seen as positive in reducing 
the financial losses caused by the delays occurred in implementing the projects. Nevertheless, 
spending was intense in the two years leading up to the deadline for eligible expenditure at the 
end of 2015. There were various reasons for this: payment suspensions; delays caused by 
public procurement issues; difficulties with larger investments where there can be various legal 
issues that delay implementation; or, the time it takes to implement more complex operations, 
such as urban regeneration measures or research and innovation. Nevertheless, absorption 
challenges were particularly great in some cases. In Romania and Greece, there has been 
significant pressure on programme authorities to accelerate spending and reach higher 
absorption rates for specific OPs. 
4.1.2 Responses to absorption pressures at closure 
 
Programme authorities have reacted to these absorption pressures as closure approached and 
various responses can be identified:  
x A common approach was for MSs to set initial spending deadlines that were earlier 
than the EC¶VFXW-off date at the end of 2015. For instance, internal closure deadlines 
were set in Denmark, Finland, France, Slovenia and Belgium (Flanders), with the intention 
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of spending all EU funding prior to the EC deadline. Denmark aimed to close all projects by 
end of 2014; Flanders (Belgium) and France by the end of June and July 2015 respectively. 
The aim was to give sufficient time to deal with implementation issues and to complete the 
closure process. However, these internal deadlines were challenging to meet and 
dates were usually pushed back to allow maximum time for absorption. For 
instance, the internal deadline for spending set by the Finnish authorities was eventually 
moved from the end of May 2015 to the end of August. 
 
These internal deadlines were often accompanied by guidance from national authorities to 
programme bodies to facilitate full absorption at the end of the programming period. In Finland, 
for instance, this included advice to IBs: that special attention should be paid to the quality of 
project implementation plans in order to facilitate a smooth processing of the payment claims 
and avoid delays caused by requests for clarification; that IBs could consider lump sum 
payments to facilitate absorption; that IBs should consider preliminary studies or the 
dissemination of good practice to strengthen the implementation plans project applications; 
and to consider if the funds could be used in projects implemented by the IBs themselves. 
 
x In some cases, programme authorities altered OP co-financing rates. In Pomorskie 
(Poland), the MA changed the co-financing rate for the OP in 2015 from 75% to 85% in 
order to improve absorption of ERDF ± this did not change funding in real terms but only 
WKHPRQH\DYDLODEOHµRQSDSHU¶,QWKH(5')FR-funding rate was raised from 40% to 
45% in the Western Finland OP in order to reach full absorption.  
 
x Overbooking and use of the provision for 10% flexibility in the allocation of funds 
to different OP priorities was considered in all cases to be a valuable measure to 
ensure that the funds available were absorbed by the spending deadline. As part of their 
standard approach to programming, many programme authorities approved more projects 
than there was funding available, thereby creating a reserve list of projects. The 10% 
flexibility rule facilitated the use of overbooking by simplifying the procedures for shifting 
funds between OP priorities. This flexibility allowed programmes to respond to changing 
circumstances (e.g. the impact of the global financial crisis, differential intervention rates 
on levels of demand from beneficiaries, changes in available funding due to exchange rate 
fluctuations, problems with non-functioning projects etc.). 
 
x Special arrangements made for Greece. In Greece, the impact of the financial crisis 
severely limited the availability of domestic co-financing. Difficulties in payments faced in 
2015 delayed projects up to six months, leaving very little time for closure. Towards the 
end of 2015, the Regulation (EU) 2015/1839 amended the Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 
as regards specific measures for Greece.44 The ceiling for the cumulative total amount of 
pre-financing and interim payments made, amounted to 100% of the contribution from the 
Funds to the 2007-13 Convergence and Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
objectives in Greece. Moreover, interim payments and payments of the final balance were 
to be calculated by applying a maximum co-financing rate of 100% to the eligible 
expenditure indicated for Greece in 2007-13. Greece is obliged to establish a mechanism to 
ensure that the additional amounts for the 2007-13 period made available under the 
Regulation are used for payments to beneficiaries and operations for its OPs. Greece also 
had to report on progress with financial performance by the end of 2016 and in the final 
implementation report. Additional pre-financing was also provided for 2014-20. 
 
                                          
44  Regulation (EU) 2015/1839 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 October 2015 amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures for Greece, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R1839&from=EN  
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These responses to absorption pressures in the context of closure had little or no 
impact on the strategic quality of OPs because they covered funding that has been 
approved by programme authorities. Nevertheless, there are risks associated with these 
approaches:  
x Where overbooking covers a significant level of funding, there is a risk that non-
EU funds may be insufficient to cover all overbooked projects. This is not a significant 
issue for many MS. In most cases, it is anticipated that there will be enough funding 
remaining from the 2007-13 period to carry over until the new programmes are launched, 
including funds being returned by projects, allowing funding to be re-committed. Where 
continuity is expected in 2014-20 for some of the projects receiving funding, these could 
continue at the projects¶ own risk, by spending their money first and EU funds later, as 
expenditure is eligible from 1 January 2014. However, there may also be a shortage of 
domestic funding in some MSs to self-fund such transition arrangements. For instance, in 
Greece, excessive overbooking has been a serious concern in some OPs, especially given 
the limited alternative funding available, and this has complicated closure processes. 
 
x Extending the spending deadline puts pressure on certifying and audit tasks as 
part of the closure process. Allowing OP spending up to the EC deadline of the end of 
2015 inevitably limits the time available for CAs and AAs to check the spending, especially 
as they work on their parts of closure packages. 
4.1.3 Phasing of operations and retrospection of projects 
 
In some case study OPs, two other responses to absorption pressures could be identified: 
x The phasing of operations. In Greece and Romania, MAs have observed slippages in 
the implementation timetable of some projects, especially MPs, and the risk that they 
may not be completed by closure deadlines. In response, they have sought EC approval 
to split the project in phases, a first phase being implemented within the current 
programming period and the next phase ± completing the project in its entirety ± being 
implemented over the programming period 2014-20. Based on data from the Ministry 
of European Funds in Romania, in March 2016, around 16 MPs (amounting to EUR 3.9 
billion and eligible for EUR 3.2 billion from ERDF and CF) and 14 non-MPs (amounting 
to EUR 171 million and eligible for EUR 137 million from ERDF and CF) were submitted 
for phasing approval by the OP Transport to the EC.45 In Greece, a significant number 
of MPs were not completed and phasing has been required. 
 
x Retrospection. Referring to the award by the MA of an EU grant to an operation which 
has already incurred significant expenditure or indeed is already complete before the 
grant is formally awarded. Such projects have normally received funding from national 
funds. While a potential solution for absorption pressures, the use of retrospective 
projects creates the risk of not respecting eligibility requirements. This can relate to the 
selection criteria, publicity rules, timely management verifications and public 
procurement rules. Issues arising from this mismatch can complicate the closure 
process.46 In Romania, due to the slow rhythm of implementation of the OP Transport, 
in March 2016, several major retrospective projects (six road infrastructure and one rail 
                                          
45  Romania submitted projects for phasing amounting to a total of EUR 8.7 billion. According to a member of the 
Romanian Unit in DG REGIO, almost half of all phased projects from the EU28 come from Romania. Therefore, 
phasing is a major stake for the country, with strong implications for the closure of several OPs (Transport, 
Environment, Economic Competitiveness).  
46  European Commission (2011) Analysis Of Errors In Cohesion Policy For The Years 2006- 2009: Actions Taken By 
The Commission And The Way Forward, Commission Staff Working Paper Brussels, 5.10.2011, SEC(2011) 1179 
final. 
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infrastructure project) were sent to the EC for approval. These amounted to EUR 569 
million.47 
 
In several respects, these last two approaches are more problematic. 
 
x First, they are bureaucratically difficult to implement and this can have an 
impact on efficient programme closure. In Romania, phasing involved several 
complex internal procedures, reviews of projects and submission for approval to the EC 
(at the end of March 2016). Given its complexity, phasing was a µlearning by doing¶ 
process for both the EC and the Romanian authorities. A specific problem was that 
projects could not be phased in line with the COCOF (Coordination Committee of the 
Funds) Guidelines because of Romanian public procurement legislation, as the phasing 
imposed substantial modifications to the contracts already under implementation. In 
other words, there was a potential mismatch between the legal norms developed at the 
EU/national levels and the specific practical and thematic problems faced by those 
involved in the closure of the programme. Similarly, in Greece there was a great 
difficulty in organising the phasing of projects. EC guidelines set very strict procedures 
and discussion between Greek authorities and the EC on how a project could be 
separated in two phases lasted for a year. Similar implementation challenges were 
evident for the use of retrospection. In Romania, the MA of the OP Transport and the 
national AA were involved in assessing if potential projects were eligible for funding 
under EC rules. Several problems were identified in the initial screening of retrospective 
projects: lack of correlation between construction authorisations and environmental 
permits and public procurement deficiencies.48 
 
x Second, there are questions about the impact of these approaches on the strategic 
performance of OPs. The contribution of retrospective projects to the strategic 
objectives of OPs can be questioned as they were not developed in response to OP-
specific priorities, funding calls and selection criteria. On the one hand, the phasing of 
operations can strengthen strategic impact, given the possibility of continuing the 
implementation of strategic projects beyond closure without placing a burden on the 
national budget. On the other hand, a potentially negative aspect is that the space for 
the development of new strategic operations in the 2014-20 period is inevitably 
constrained. 
4.1.4 Simplification and absorption/closure tensions  
 
Finally, it should be noted that elements of the EC¶V µVLPSOLILFDWLRQDJHQGD¶KDYH QRW
eased the pressures on closure stemming from absorption demands.  
x For instance, the impact of the EC¶VµVLQJOHDXGLW¶SULQFLSOHKDVEHHQ limited. The 
EC FDQ JLYH µVLQJOH DXGLW¶ VWDWXV WR VSHFLILF 23V FRQILUPLQJ WKDW LW LV VDWLVILHG ZLWK
internal control arrangements and will rely on assurance for AA reports. For such OPs, 
the EC ZLOOQRWFDUU\RXWLWVRZQµRQWKHVSRW¶FKHFNV,QWKHRU\this simplifies the burden 
of multiple audits, which are a particular issue at the end of programming periods. The 
µVLQJOHDXGLW¶FRQFHSWLVSRWHQWLDOO\UHOHYDQWIRUFORVXUH:KHUHµVLQJOHDXGLW¶$UWLFOH49) 
status has been granted to an OP, the EC will be able to draw assurance that the final 
payment is legal and regular from the work of the AA rather than carrying out its own 
                                          
47  *RYHUQPHQWRI5RPDQLD5HVSRQVHWR3DUOLDPHQWDU\LQWHUSHOODWLRQRQWKHµ6WDWHRI(8IXQGVDEVRUSWLRQ¶
4 April 2016. 
48  *RYHUQPHQWRI5RPDQLD5HVSRQVHWR3DUOLDPHQWDU\LQWHUSHOODWLRQRQWKHµ6WDWHRI(8IXQGVDEVRUSWLRQ¶
4 April 2016. 
49  $UWLFOHVWDWXVPHDQVWKDW&RPPLVVLRQLVVDWLVILHGWKDWWKHQDWLRQDOFRPSOLDQFHDVVHVVPHQWDQGWKH$$¶VDXGLW
strategy provide sufficient assurance that the management and control systems of the Operational Programme 
function effectively. 
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detailed checks. However, this has not been the case in practice. In 2013, the ECA noted 
the need for sufficiently robust monitoring of $$V¶ work for closure. The EC can withdraw 
RUVXVSHQGµVLQJOHDXGLW¶VWDWXVDQGLWFDQVWLOOLPSRVHILQDQFLDOFRUUHFWLRQVRQWKHEDVLV
of AA controls. The incentive for OPs to obtain single audit status has been limited: by 
the end of 2014, only 76 of the 250 OPs had obtained this status (including 57 ERDF/CF 
OPs).50 Moreover, audit work has become more demanding, notably through the 
requirement that AAs submit opinions based on a statistically representative (and thus 
larger) sample of checks.51 Similarly, the option of partial closure of OPs has had 
little or no uptake, at least in part explained by the reluctance of programme 
authorities to limit the scope and reach of a programme only part of the way through 
implementation. 
4.2 Closure and types of operation 
Although raising absorption is a crucial policy objective, a key question remains whether EU 
funds are used for the most appropriate operations and whether they are successful in meeting 
the objectives for which they have been designed. This raises the issue of whether the closure 
process and the push to quickly absorb EU funding can have an influence on shaping the types 
of operations that are supported, and ultimately, the achievements of programmes. For 
instance, at the end of programming periods MSs can look to correct the impact of irregular 
spending several years after the event. In order to effect corrections without risking a reduction 
in the funding envelope, MSs have to find a sufficient number of eligible projects in the final 
years of the programming period. There is a danger that they will bypass selection criteria and 
ignore objective project assessments in order to ensure 100% absorption of the available 
funds.52 Different types of operation have different implications for absorption and closure. The 
following sections focus on three types of operation highlighted in the review of MS experiences: 
MPs, FEIs and non-functioning projects. 
4.2.1 Major projects 
 
Very large projects (including MPs) DEVRUEVXEVWDQWLDOIXQGLQJDQGFDQEHµSKDVHG¶RYHU
two programming periods but they are particularly administration-intensive because of the 
special requirements associated with them, including closure requirements. In 2007-13, there 
was significant variation across MSs in terms of the number being implemented and 
their stage of physical implementation as of 2013. 7KH(&¶VH[-post evaluation of ERDF and CF 
(Work Package Zero) for the 2007-13 programmes53 produced a list of 733 approved MPs 
implemented by 95 OPs in 21 MSs (see Figure 12). Poland is implementing by far the largest 
number of MPs in the period (208), followed by Romania (90), Spain (57) and Italy (51). 
                                          
50  European Court of Auditors (2013) 7DNLQJVWRFNRI µVLQJOHDXGLW¶DQG WKH&RPPLVVLRQ
V UHOLDQFHRQ WKHZRUNRI
national audit authorities in cohesion, Special Report No 16. 
51  .DUDNDWVDQLV * DQG :HEHU 0  µ7KH (XURSHDQ&RXUW RI $XGLWRUV DQG &RKHVLRQ SROLF\¶ LQ 3LDWWRQL 6 DQG
Polverari L (eds) Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU, Edward Elgar Press, pp. 170-185. 
52  2URV]NL-µ&ORVXUHRIWKH-&RKHVLRQDQG5XUDO'HYHORSPHQW$UHDV¶EStIF vol. 4, 2014. 
53  European Commission (2015b) Ex post evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2007-2013, focusing on the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and Cohesion Fund (CF) ± Work Package Zero: Data collection and 
quality assessment, Final Report. 
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Figure 12: Number of MPs approved 2007-13, by MS 
 
Source: European Commission (2015b) Op. cit., p. 151. 
 
The ex-post evaluation identified a total of 50 approved MPs, where physical work had not yet 
started by 2013 (see Figure 112 and Figure 13). This corresponds to around 7% of the total of 
approved MPs, with most located in the EU15. In Italy, even roughly 38% of MPs had not yet 
physically started (corresponding to 19 projects). Romania and Greece have seven and six MPs 
each that have not started yet, which accounts respectively for 7% and 12% of the total 
approved. 
Figure 13: Number of approved MPs not started 2013 
 
Source: European Commission (2015b) Op. cit., pp. 156-58. 
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Figure 14: EU funding associated with approved MPs not started 2013  
 
Source: European Commission (2015b) Op. cit., pp. 156-58.  
Note: Community amount, EUR million. 
 
The implementation of MPs in OPs created specific challenges for closure in 2007-13 reflected 
in D*5(*,2¶V JXLGDQFH VHH6HFWLRQ 3.2.2). Beyond this, DG REGIO continued to provide 
assistance to programme authorities implementing MPs to ensure a smooth closure process, 
focussing on ensuring timely adoption of the last requests for MPs' modifications, and helping 
MAs reach their implementation targets. Nevertheless, programme authorities have faced a 
number of difficulties in dealing with MPs as part of the closure process, including: 
 
x Dealing with withdrawn projects. Given the scale of funding involved, decisions to 
withdraw MPs have significant implications for absorption, particularly as closure 
expenditure deadlines approach. In Romania, some major road infrastructure projects 
have faced technical problems and implementation delays. As a result, in 2015 around 
10 main infrastructure projects were terminated, and their funding (approx. EUR 300 
million) was transferred, through a governmental decision, to the regional OP. This was 
also a measure to avoid financial decommitments for the programme, which were 
estimated in 2015 at around EUR 1.2 billion.54 
 
x Dealing with delayed MPs. MPs were often subject to implementation delays due to 
the challenging legal and technical aspects of large investments. In Greece, for instance, 
some MPs faced problems with financing and implementation in the context of the 
financial crisis had to be suspended in 2011 and restarted in 2013. Although in the case 
of these projects it was anticipated that they would be completed by March 2017, MAs 
had to address the risk that these types of projects would not be finalised before the 
final period of eligible spending at the end of 2015. Moreover, the regulatory framework 
for the 2007-13 period contained no deadline for the submission of MP applications and, 
in practice, no final deadline for the EC to adopt the related decisions. As of 15 November 
2016, 19 MP applications from seven MSs were still pending approval by DG REGIO. The 
associated total eligible cost of these projects was EUR 1 billion and the EU contribution 
was EUR 854 million. A pending MP decision complicated the closure of an OP, as the 
MAs and AAs do not know how to deal with the expenditure in question when preparing 
the closure documents. Pending decisions also create legal uncertainty for the MS. In 
particular, with the closure deadline approaching, if the EC rejects a MP there is an 
increased risk that the MS will not be able to replace it with other eligible expenditure, 
                                          
54  Ministerul Fondurilor Europene (2015) 5DSRUWXO$QQXDOGH ,PSOHPHQWDUH3URJUDPXO2SHUDĠLRQDO6HFWRULDO
³7UDQVSRUW´-2013,XQLH%XFXUH 言tLS 
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which may lead to difficulties in fully using up the EU funds by the time of closure.55 As 
noted in Section 3.2.1, phasing of MPs is an option for programme authorities but this 
is accompanied by another set of challenges. 
 
x Finally, it is worth noting that in principle, some MPs approved before the end of 
2012 were at risk of non-compliance with State aid rules and concerns were 
raised by the European Court of Auditors that issues could emerge in the course of 
programme closure.56 Of the 918 MPs approved by the EC for the 2007-13 programming 
period, decisions on 440 were adopted before the end of 2012. The Directorate-General 
for Competition did not systematically verify whether investments in public 
infrastructure concerned by these projects might involve State aid. Moreover, prior to 
2012 and the clarifications provided by the European Court of Justice in a judgment on 
a State aid case (the Leipzig-Halle judgment),57 MSs rarely notified the EC about 
investments in infrastructure. In order to mitigate this risk for the future, the EC 
strengthened its internal preventive measures and it introduced an alternative approval 
procedure, including an Independent Quality Review for the 2014-20 programming 
period. Nevertheless, legal certainty can only be provided for MSs with regard to State 
aid compliance for major projects on the basis of a MS notification followed by a EC 
State aid decision. 
4.2.2 Financial engineering instruments 
The role of non-grant-based instruments has increased significantly over successive CP 
programming periods. Allocation to FEIs (or financial instruments for the 2014-20 programming 
period) has been going up continuously from an estimated investment EUR 0.6 billion in 1994-
99 to c. 1.3 billion in 2000-06 and to over EUR 17 billion in 2007-13. However, the amounts 
committed to FEIs varied widely between MSs (see Figure 15). 
 
While the highest levels of OP commitments to FEIs in absolute terms can be found in Italy, 
Greece, Germany and the United Kingdom, their relative importance is highest in Belgium and 
Denmark (over 11%), followed by Italy, the United Kingdom and Lithuania. 
 
However, widespread use of FEIs in domestic policy is not necessarily reflected in the 
scale of OP commitments to FEIs. One reason could be that the programme is too small to 
justify the complex process of setting up specific instruments and repayable support is left to 
domestic policy (as, for instance, in Flanders). Another reason can be that Structural Funds are 
investing in particular types of projects (e.g. innovation support) that are perceived to be less 
suitable for the use of FEIs, even though repayable support is an established part of domestic 
economic development policy (as, for instance, in Austria).58 
 
                                          
55  European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and 
rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016. 
56  European Court of Auditors (2016) More efforts needed to raise awareness of and enforce compliance with State 
aid rules in cohesion policy, Special Report No 24, p. 62. 
57  Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 19 December 2012. Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig-
Halle GmbH v European Commission. Appeal - State aids - &RQFHSWRIµXQGHUWDNLQJ¶- Economic activity -Airport 
infrastructure construction ± Runway. Case C-288/11 P, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
288/11&language=EN  
58  Wishlade F and Michie R (2014) Financial instruments in 2014-20: learning from 2007-13 and adapting to the new 
environmentSDSHUSUHVHQWHGµ&KDOOHQJHVIRUWKH1HZ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\-DQ$FDGHPLFDQG3ROLF\'HEDWH¶
Riga, 4-6 February 2014. 
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Figure 15: Absolute and relative commitments to FEIs in 2007-13 
 
Source: Wishlade F and Michie R (2014) Financial instruments in 2014-20: learning from 2007-13 and adapting to 
the new environmentSDSHUSUHVHQWHGµ&KDOOHQJHVIRUWKH1HZ&RKHVLRQ3ROLF\-20: an Academic 
DQG3ROLF\'HEDWH¶5LJD-6 February 2014. 
 
Increased allocations for FEIs have been cited as a solution to absorption pressures and 
closure issues by the EC in 2007-13. For instance, it urged the MA of the Integrated OP in the 
Czech Republic to look into the possibility to use some of its remaining allocation for FEI 
activities.59 However, there are specific technical requirements and challenges related to these 
at the closure stage (see Section 3.2.2). As they give the possibility of using the same funds 
several times through various revolving cycles, closure applies to FEIs in a specific way. In 
2016, the EC noted that as closure approached, there was an increased risk that amounts 
committed to FEIs would not be fully absorbed at the end of the programming period and that 
continued efforts will be needed to improve implementation in order to avoid losses at the end 
of the period.60 
 
Programme authorities have experienced several challenges in incorporating FEI-
specific requirements in the OP closure process. These include: 
x Impact of extension of deadlines on FEI spending on closure. Programme 
authorities have taken advantage of the later deadline for spending under FEIs (financial 
support can be provided to final recipients until 31 March 2017). However, this has had 
an impact on the closure procedure as programme authorities struggled to factor in 
sufficient time to allow the CA and AA to complete their work on time.61 
x This tension has been exacerbated by the complexity of FEI closure tasks, 
especially where knowledge, experience and administrative capacity is low. 
Programme authorities have found that the closure of FEIs requires more administrative 
effort than for more straightforward operations, especially where the experience of 
                                          
59  European Commission (2016b) Task Force promotes better use of EU funding, DG REGIO Newsroom item 31 March 
2016, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2016/03/31-03-2016-task-force-promotes-better-
use-of-eu-funding 
60  DG Regional and Urban Policy (2016) 2015 Annual Activity Report, 27 April 2016, p. 31. 
61  Vironen H and Lehuraux T (2016) First signs of growth: progress with the 2014-20 programmes, IQ-Net Review 
Paper 38(1), European Policies Research Centre, Glasgow, p. 28. 
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implementing and closing FEIs is limited. In this context, EC guidance has not always 
been helpful. The EC has produced a range of documents and guidelines for FEIs but 
there has still been some uncertainty, for instance concerning cut-off dates for reporting 
reflows from initial investment as part of the closure process. Some programme 
authorities found that EC guidance on how to fill in closure templates for FEIs was 
communicated too late (in February 2017).  
 
x There have been specific pressures in the audit of FEIs at closure. The auditing 
of FEIs has proven to be complex, requiring specific competences, particularly in the 
final phase of programmes where assessments of the performance of the instruments 
is carried out. On the one hand, AAs were not required to audit FEI expenditure during 
the programming period. Taking into account the complexity of the process and the 
limited time available given the extended spending deadline, the ECA noted the risk that 
this expenditure would not be checked adequately for eligibility at the time of closure.62 
It should be noted that in the 'Questions and Answers' document on closure63 for the 
MSs, the EC acknowledged this time pressure and recommended that the CA sends the 
last interim payment claim (including the expenditure that will be certified at closure) 
to the AA by 30 June 2016 to enable it to perform the necessary audit work. On the 
other hand, some programme authorities have found the focus on audit of FEIs 
excessive. The requirements concerning the reporting of FEIs as part of closure have 
grown over time and are considered by some as too demanding. In Poland, a 
fundamental issue has been a lengthy EC audit of FEIs which was succeeded by a 
thematic audit by the Polish AA. Checks have been continuous, meaning that the focus 
has been on procedural correctness rather than strategic implementation. 
4.2.3 Non-functioning projects 
 
For most programme authorities covered in the research, dealing with non-functioning 
projects was not seen as an important issue for the closure process. In most cases, 
non-functioning projects would have been closed down during the programming period. 
However, in Greece, a number of projects (about 10-12 projects) will be declared as non-
functioning. The main reason is that those are projects from 2000-06 that cannot be phased. 
For the OP Transport in Romania only one project (Baia Mare airport) has been included in an 
official non-functioning project list.64 However, it is possible that more projects will be added. 
In these cases, the benefits of including the expenditure paid for non-functioning projects in a 
final statement have to be balanced with the obligations of funding the remainder of the projects 
from national resources, monitoring these projects closely and reporting to the EC on a six-
monthly basis and accepting the risk that EU funds may have to be reimbursed if projects 
are not complete by the March 2019 deadline.  
4.3 Closure and governance & administration 
4.3.1 Variation in administrative capacity 
 
Closure can bring capacity challenges for MSs, particularly where the quality of governance is 
low. Figure 16 shows a map of the variance of the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 
at NUTS 2 level. 
                                          
62  European Court of Auditors (2017a) An assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and 
rural development programmes, Special report N°36/2016. 
63  European Commission (2013) Q&A on the 2007-2013 programmes closure. 
64  Ministerul DezvROWăULL5HJLRQDOH$GPLQLVWUD ?LHL3XEOLFHúL)RQGXULORU(XURSHQHAprobarea listelor proiectelor 
QHIXQFĠLRQDOHFRQIRUPSUHYHGHULORU+RWăUkULL*XYHUQXOXLQUSULYLQGvQFKLGHUHDSURJUDPHORURSHUDĠLRQDOH
ILQDQĠDWHvQSHULRDGD-2013 prin FondXO(XURSHDQGH'H]YROWDUH5HJLRQDOă)RQGXO6RFLDO(XURSHDQ)RQGXOGH
&RH]LXQH 言i)RQGXO(XURSHDQSHQWUX3HVFXLW, 27 February 2017. 
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Figure 16: European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 2013 
 
Source: Charron N, Dijkstra L and Lapuente V (2015) µ0DSSLQJWKH5HJLRQDO'LYLGHLQ(XURSH$0HDVXUHIRU$VVHVVLQJ
Quality of Government in 206 (XURSHDQ 5HJLRQV¶ Social Indicators Research, vol 122 (2): 315-346, see also 
https://nicholascharron.wordpress.com/european-quality-of-government-index-eqi/  
 
Variation in the quality of governance can express itself in three different areas: the creation 
of suitable closure-related structures; the ability to provide adequate human resources; and 
the use of systems and tools assisting with the closure process. 
 
Structures: a clear assignment of responsibilities and tasks to institutions, specifically at the 
level of departments with programme responsibilities. This can involve: 
x setting up dedicated units for closure (e.g. Czech Republic, Wales, England). In Wales, 
a project closure group involves key stakeholders to strengthen ownership and track the 
way risks are being managed. In England, a Closure Technical Working Group operates 
at working level while a Closure Operational Policy Assurance Group takes strategic 
decisions on closure at the senior level. 
 
Human resources: the ability to detail tasks and responsibilities at the level of job description; 
estimate the number and qualifications of staff and fulfil the recruitment needs; timely 
availability of experienced, skilled and motivated staff.65  
x Providing specific training, workshops (England, Finland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Wales).  
x Some authorities are appointing a closure manager to ensure a coherent approach within 
the various teams (Denmark, Scotland). 
x Others are allocating staff to the process (Czech Republic). 
                                          
65 European Parliament (2013) Op cit. 
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Systems and tools: the availability of instruments (methods, guidelines, manuals, etc.) that 
can enhance the effectiveness of the functioning of the system. For closure, this can include 
tasks relating to: 
x Drawing up an initial risk register, both programme and project related. For instance, 
this can include the creation of a risk rating system or risk profiles for the approval of 
projects in the final years of the programming period.  
x Creating Action Plans and setting timetables, with deadlines for claims from project 
sponsors generally being set in so that MAs have time to deal with the remaining issues 
at programme level. 
4.3.2 The governance of closure processes  
 
Effective programme closure depends on the timely input of EU, national and programme levels. 
The challenges of managing the programme closure process include the development of 
timetables and coordination arrangements across different levels and approaches vary, 
depending on existing administrative arrangements, the size and scope of programmes etc. 
MSs and programme authorities developed various mechanisms and structures to strengthen 
coordination in 2007-13 (see Box 3 for an example from Finland). 
 
Box 3: Closure timetable in Finland  
The Finnish closure timetable was communicated to all involved bodies in a series of closure 
letters. The last communication finalising the timing was sent on 25 June 2015. 
 
31 August 2015  End of financial support to projects which do not fall under the 
categories below. 
 
31 October 2015  End of financial support to projects managed via the Finnish 
Structural Funds system EURA 2007. 
31 December 2015  End of financial support to business aid and technical assistance 
projects. 
31 December 2015  End of the eligibility period 
x Eligibility check of payments done 
x All payments to the projects made 
x Any possible additional payments due to adjustment requests 
made 
Payment applications processed and paid (including corrections) 
28 February 2016  All projects above can be closed if 
x all payments have been made; 
x all implementation reports and a final report have been 
VXEPLWWHGDQGPDUNHGDVµILQDOLVHG¶DQG 
x on-the-spot inspections have been completed or are in progress. 
25 March 2016  The recoveries of payments made before 31 December 2015 shall be 
paid back to the intermediate bodies. The recoveries of payments 
made after 1 January 2016 shall be paid back at the first instance. 
30 April 2016  All projects shall be closed in the data management systems. 
31 October 2016 Decisions on the latest findings of project and system inspections. 
31 March 2017 Closure documents need to be sent to the EC. 
31 December 2021 Project documentation including documentation on accounting shall 
be stored until this date. 
 
Source: Interview with Finnish programme managers, March 2017. 
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(i) Coordination between programme and national level 
In most cases, national government bodies responsible for coordinating CP 
management and implementation were involved, feeding into the development of EC 
closure guidance, developing domestic guidance and coordinating the closure process across 
OPs.  
x In Germany, the first steps on closure taken at federal level, i.e. the Federal Ministry for 
the Economy and Innovation (which is responsible for coordinating Germany-wide issues 
on CP, especially the ERDF) asked the MAs of all programmes to provide them with any 
questions they have on OP closure, so that these can be discussed with the EC. National 
government bodies were also involved alongside the EC in the organisation of a series 
of workshops across MSs on issues relating to OP closure. 
  
x The United Kingdom Closure Group, which drew up a Closure Pack in a broadly common 
United Kingdom format. Within this, a Wales-specific closure pack was produced, 
tailored for each Fund and programme. There was a phased approach to testing and 
implementing the guidance, starting with the Urban Community Initiative as a pilot. 
 
In France, closure guidance was developed by the Home Affairs Ministry (National Coordinating 
Authority for the 2007-13 period) in November 2013 (see Box 4). 
Box 4: National closure guidance in France 
National guidance refers to a non-binding ministerial guideline asking the MAs (directly 
under the authority of the Ministry for that period) to: 
x Designate one person in charge of closure tasks within the Europe Unit (e.g. Haute-
Normandie hired a person on a 6-month contract to manage the closure process) 
x Create a working group that ensures regular monitoring and programming of closure 
tasks 
x Establish a rewinding calendar for closure tasks 
x Follow specific advice regarding monitoring of certain projects (large projects, FIs, 
revenue-generating operations, µsleeping¶ operations) and other procedural good 
practices (e.g. regular reminders to beneficiaries) 
x Circulate µOperation Control Report¶as they are issued during the second semester of 
2015 (as opposed to transfers all at once) 
x Closure indicator: Rate of paid and archived operations (e.g. specific monitoring 
instruments created in Picardie) 
x Scoreboards monitored by the National Coordinating authority: 
o 0RQLWRULQJRIµVOHHSLQJ¶ operations 
o Monitoring of payment of public co-funding 
o Monitoring of operations without µ2SHUDWLRQ&RQWURO5HSRUW¶ and/or certificate 
for payment 
o Monitoring of under-implemented operations 
o General progress (not implemented, not paid) 
Source: Interview with French programme managers, March 2017. 
(ii) Coordination between MA, AA and CA  
At programme level, MAs often initiated coordination arrangements that drew together other 
key bodies involved in closure: AAs, CAs and IBs.  
x A first step in this process often involved MAs interpreting the EC closure guidelines 
and, if necessary, preparing additional written advice for the OP implementing 
bodies. Some MAs collected closure questions internally and from CA and AA, and have 
sent these to national authorities.  
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x To facilitate information dissemination, working groups were set up in several MSs, 
either at national or programme level, or existing working groups were used 
to discuss closure issues at regular meetings (e.g. United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Romania). These working groups brought together the partners involved in 
closure, mainly AA, CA, MA and IBs. In Romania, a formal Inter-Institutional Working 
Group led by the Ministry of European Funds supervised the closure of national OPs. 
This working group was composed of heads of MAs, IBs, CA and AA. In Wales, the MA 
re-established its own Closure Group (in 2008), alongside a United Kingdom Working 
Group, to keep closure on the programme management agenda. By mid-2016, the MA, 
CA and AA in Wales were meeting monthly. This increased to fortnightly from January 
2017 and from March 2017 moved to a short meeting every other day. However, it 
should be noted that the establishment of these groups did not automatically guarantee 
smooth coordination: there were still challenges in developing a common approach to 
different aspects of the closure process, where MA and CA interpretations of EC guidance 
varied.  
 
x Close proximity of MA and AA representatives facilitated informal coordination. 
In Pomorskie (Poland) and Bavaria, representatives of the AA share the same building 
as the MA. Being physically located in the same building when the closure documentation 
is prepared and uploaded helped to get issues resolved quickly.  
4.3.3 Administrative capacities and programme closure 
(i) Capacity issues 
A fundamental area of concern for closure related to capacity issues, covering both who is there 
to carry out the tasks, and how much accurate information there is to make sure the tasks are 
completed properly. The problem is acute both where programme authorities are managing 
the closure of the 2007-13 OP and the launch of the 2014-20 OP simultaneously. For 
instance, the first full AIR for 2014-20 has to be produced at the same time as the FIR for 
2007-7KHLVVXHFDQEHVHHQDVDµYLFLRXVFLUFOH¶ZKHUH limited capacity causes delays in 
closure, which impact on launch of the next OP, which again creates delayed closure etc. The 
µRYHUODS¶LVVXHDOVRZRUNVLQERWKGLUHFWLRQVLQGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WVLQVRPHFDVHVLWPHDQVWKDW
administrative focus turns to launch of the new OP. It is inevitable that the attention of 
programme authorities, beneficiaries and other stakeholders turns to the opportunities and 
demands coming from the new period, leaving little capacity to execute closure processes 
correctly and efficiently. In other contexts, particularly where closure is difficult or delayed, 
focus on closure impedes the launch of new OPs. Potentially, administrative resources can 
be stretched simultaneously across four programming periods: closing some residual 2000-06 
OPs, closure of 2007-13 OPs, launch and implementation of 2014-20 OPs and input into post-
2020 thinking and debates. There has also been a strain on administrative capacity for 
AAs as in some cases late spending and delayed approval of new OPs meant that closure tasks 
coincided with systems audits for 2014-20 programmes. 
 
These pressures are exacerbated in specific programme contexts:  
x Where MSs have not been involved in closing a programming period yet (e.g. 
Romania) or where it is the first time for a MA to carry out a complicated technical set 
of tasks (e.g. Pomorskie). 
  
x Where higher levels of staff turnover among MAs mean that institutional 
memory has been lost. Having long-term staff who remember the 2000-06 period is 
found to be invaluable in terms of knowledge and experience of the technicalities 
involved in closure but also in ensuring OP documentation is complete and consistent. 
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x Where staff time is limited by requirements to contribute to audits, evaluations 
etc. External audits (e.g. by the EC) created a significant additional burden for some 
MAs as they prepared for closure, particularly when this coincided with domestic audits 
(e.g. Pomorskie). 
 
x Where management tasks are transferred between organisations. This can 
cause disruption to the allocation of closure responsibilities and the availability 
of other resources that are crucial for closure, particularly record storage. In 
Scotland, programme management was reorganised part-way through the 2007-13 
programming period with closure of the programme secretariats and centralisation of 
their function within the Scottish Government. This necessitated a reorganisation of 
record keeping arrangements. In Greece, a transition arrangement was required to 
facilitate closure of the Accessibility OP as the MA shifted to the Ministry of Development 
from the Ministry of Transport for the 2014-20 period.  
 
x Where domestic reforms lead to organisational change and staff transfers. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom (England), a process of centralisation or in France, a 
process of decentralisation. This can mean the abolition of some structures, the creation 
of others and substantial turnaround of staff.  
(ii) Responses by programme authorities 
MSs have taken different steps in response to these pressures: 
x Recruitment. In some German Länder, additional staff were recruited in advance of 
2015 because the MA and IB expected the workload to increase. However, the workload 
is significantly higher even than had been anticipated. Moreover, it is challenging to 
recruit temporary staff who have the necessary experience and expertise for closure. In 
Wales, the AA hired agency workers as well as giving some existing staff exclusive 
closure duties: one new agency person who spent 95% of their time on closure work 
plus two permanent team members. In France, some MAs introduced new fixed-ended 
contracts to deal with closure issues, compensating for staff transferred to the MAs for 
the launch of 2014-20 OPs.  
 
x Outsourcing. To alleviate the workload, some partners have chosen to externalise 
some closure tasks, such as certification (e.g. some MAs in France). 
 
x Switching the focus of work over time. For specified periods, some programme 
authorities have switched the focus between closure of 2007-13 OPs and launch of 2014-
20 OPs. In Greece, in 2015 for instance emphasis was given and resources were 
committed to the launch of the 2014-20 OP. In autumn 2016, the focus shifted to 
closure.  
 
x Review of record keeping where there has been organisational change or staff 
turnover. In some cases, such as Scotland and Wales there has been discussion of the 
possibility of reorganising records within government, to safeguard project sponsors 
records when projects were wound up. 
 
x $SSRLQWLQJFORVXUHPDQDJHUVRUµchampions. In order to guarantee some focus on 
closure while staff are also engaged on the launch and implementation of the new OP. 
In some cases, programme authorities identified networks of closure managers or 
µFKDPSLRQV¶WREHFRPHWKHPDLQSRLQWRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQRn closure, to be responsible 
for disseminating information within MAs, CAs and AAs and to be the expert on the 
closure process within each unit. This approach was introduced to ensure that consistent 
messages were being delivered (e.g. Wales). 
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4.3.4 Administration of specific closure tasks 
(i) Optimal absorption 
x Targeting projects at risk of non-completion. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the MA 
established a working group responsible for identifying projects at risk of not being 
completed and for finding ways of accelerating payments, including ensuring that 
payment claims are submitted. In Wales, there has been a structured approach to 
identifying projects at different stages of completion (see Box 5).  
Box 5: Closure of projects at risk of non-completion in Wales 
TKH:HOVK(XURSHDQ)XQGLQJ2IILFH:()2RUJDQLVHGDµFORVXUHZHHN¶KHOGLQ-XO\
This involved identifying a set of projects which were on the verge of closing, with all 
involved staff working in a dedicated way only on closure of those projects for that week. 
This concentrated approach was found to be helpful. Leading on from the closure week, 
WKUHHµFORVXUHPHHWLQJV¶ZHUHKHOGLQ-XO\$XJXVWDQG6HStember 2015. These identified 
approximately 60 very overdue projects and invited all relevant internal staff to a special 
session. A whole day was blocked out for each session with a ten minute slot allocated for 
each project. Relevant staff discussed problems related to closure (e.g. open issues, issues 
causing delay, actions to be taken). The aim was to come up with an Action Plan for each 
project with a realistic timescale and to identify any issues which needed to be addressed, 
such as lack of resources, difficulties obtaining information from project sponsors and 
GHFLVLRQVUHTXLUHGE\WKH0$¶Vsenior management team. This is assessed by WEFO to 
have worked very well and it strengthened internal communication on closure. 
Source: Interview with Welsh programme managers, March 2017. 
(ii) Settling accounts, ensuring regularity, legality 
x Taking a proactive approach. To avoid an excessive closure task at the end of the 
period, programme authorities in Western Finland and Flanders (Belgium) have taken a 
proactive approach to closure and tried to close projects throughout the programming 
SHULRGµVWDJJHU¶FORVXUH,Q6FRWODQGDQG:DOHVSURJUDPPHDXWKRULWLHVHPEDUNHGRQ
a campaign of quality assurance when closing individual projects, hoping that timely and 
tidy closure at project level will translate to similar at programme level. In Wales, the 
MA had a closure checklist which they could use when projects finish claiming, so checks 
were done on an ongoing basis. 
 
x Ensuring audit capacity. It is important to reiterate the demands on AA capacities 
during closure. The EC has stated that most AAs have the capacity to provide reliable 
audit results. However, it also emphasises the need to ensure sufficient capacity, 
particularly during closure.66 As already noted (see Section 3.2.3), the EC pursues 
capacity-building activities for AAs: the organisation of fora for exchanges on audit 
issues, targeted training on request etc. National arrangements are also in place to help 
build audit capacity. In Italy, the national IGRUE (national coordination of all AAs) 
disseminated guidance documents, circulated documents from the EC, participated 
(alongside regions) in the Homologues group and disseminated that documentation also. 
Nevertheless, the need for ongoing capacity-building across MSs is evident. For instance, 
a recent report by ECA noted a significant level of non-compliance with State aid rules 
in 2007-13 programmes. Almost 20% of CP projects with State aid relevance were 
affected by State aid errors. At the same time, audit authorities in the MSs detected 
infringements at a far lower rate than either the EC or the EU auditors. MSs found errors 
in just 3.6% of relevant projects, while the EU auditors detected more than five times 
as many using a similar methodology. 
                                          
66 DG Regional and Urban Policy (2016a) 2015 Annual Activity Report, 27 April 2016, pp. 101-102. 
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(iii) Writing and submitting the closure package documents 
Administrative arrangements also had to be made for writing and submitting the FIR. All three 
closure documents were to be submitted to the EC via SFC2007 by the deadline. This required 
coordination between MA, CA and AA. In MSs with complex programme architectures, close 
coordination at national and OP level for submission was important. In several MSs national 
authorities collected FIRs and submitted them jointly to the OP. In Germany, the Länder MAs 
wrote their own FIRs, but all were jointly submitted to the EC from the federal level. Within 
this, Nordrhein-Westfalen submitted a draft closure report to the EC in 2016. A similar approach 
took place in Austria. In the United Kingdom, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) was MA for all ERDF OPs in England and locally based teams responsible 
for delivering the programmes submitted their contributions to the FIR. At the same time, MAs 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland prepared FIRs. In some MAs in France, the production 
of the FIR was outsourced. 
(iv) Emphasis on communication 
The closure process can be seen as one of the key opportunities to disseminate the 
results through the final report submitted at closure.67 There is evidence that programme 
authorities are increasingly aware of the communication advantages of closure documents, 
although there are caveats linked to administrative resources. 
 
For instance, %DYDULD KDV SURGXFHG D µFORVXUH EURFKXUH¶ RQ WKH DFKLHYHPHQWV RI
programme (see Box 6). In Wales, a Welsh Government minister announced for the first 
time that 100% of the money earmarked in the programme will be drawn down. This 
opportunity for positive communication is attributed to aspects of the closure provisions, 
notably the 10% flexibility mechanism.  
 
Nevertheless, in several cases, the closure process has limited actions related to 
communication and visibility, due to the focus on procedural correctness in the 
closure process or lack of dedicated resources (e.g. Finland). 
 
Box 6: Communicating programme closure in Bavaria 
The Bavarian ERDF MA decided to use programme closure as an opportunity to 
communicate the achievements of the 2007-13 OP. Using the contents of the FIR, it 
produced a brochure targeted at the general public. The brochure takes stock of 
LQYHVWPHQWVXQGHUHDFKRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VILYH3ULRULW\$[HVDQGLOOXVWUDWHVWKHVHZLWK
one or two concrete project examples. 
However, it does not specifically mention the actual closure of the 2007-13 programming 
period, as it was thought to be difficult to communicate to the wider public how a 
programme that ran until 2013 would only be finished in 2017. The brochure is available 
for download and is used for public events. It has been sent to all members of the Bavarian 
Parliament and to Bavarian members in the EU Parliament. 
Source: Interview with MA of the Bavaria OP and 
https://www.stmwi.bayern.de/fileadmin/user_upload/stmwi/Publikationen/2017/2017-04-
12_EFRE_RWB_Abschlussinfo.pdf  
 
  
                                          
67  5RGUtJXH]6iH]9  µ&ORVXUH-2006: state-of-SOD\DQG OHVVRQV OHDUQW¶ INTERACT Newsletter, Autumn 
2013. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
The overall assessment of the research is that the formal closure of ERDF and CF 
programmes in 2007-13 was carried out in an efficient manner. The research for this 
study was carried out as closure packages were being compiled and submitted to the EC, so 
while it is able to provide a positive assessment of the formal process of submission it cannot 
assess EC reviews of the closure documents themselves. The desk research and fieldwork 
interviews in MSs demonstrate broad satisfaction with the guidelines provided by the EC and 
the additional support supplied. Generally, MSs were satisfied with their own arrangements for 
the formal process of assembling and submitting closure packages. 
 
The research argues that beyond this formal process, closure should be perceived as 
an integral part of programme implementation: influencing the allocation of remaining 
resources; in securing and raising awareness of programme achievements and legacies; and, 
in supporting an efficient transition to the next programming period. It identifies three issues 
that can condition closure, both in terms of the formal process and in relation to this broader 
strategic role in programme implementation: financial absorption; types of intervention; and 
administrative capacity/governance. 
 
The aim to absorb the maximum available funding before the spending deadline put 
pressure on the closure process. For some MSs, programme closure in 2007-13 was more 
challenging than in 2000-06 due to the impact of the economic crisis: lack of liquidity has led 
to slower project implementation and this in turn put pressure on closure as programme 
authorities struggled to absorb funds by the deadline for eligible spending. However, this 
pressure has been eased by the regulations (notably the 10% flexibility rule) and closure 
management strategies among MSs LQFOXGLQJWKHXVHRIµRYHUERRNLQJ¶). The special measures 
to facilitate absorption (e.g. Greece) were valued in terms of efficient closure.  
 
The implementation of FEIs and major projects has had implications for the quality 
of the closure process. Programme authorities have experienced several challenges in 
incorporating FEI-specific requirements in the OP closure process: the impact of extended 
deadlines on FEI spending; the complexity of FEI closure tasks, especially where knowledge, 
experience and administrative capacity was limited; and specific pressures in the audit of FEIs 
at closure. In the opinion of some MS, the EC guidance on these issues was not provided early 
enough. Programme authorities have faced difficulties in dealing with delayed or withdrawn 
major projects as part of the closure process. These interventions are associated with significant 
levels of funding and implementation often involving complex legal and technical issues. 
Phasing has been pursued by MS as a means to alleviate pressures at closure and strengthen 
strategic impact by continuing the implementation of strategic projects beyond closure. On the 
other hand, phasing involves several complex administrative procedures that complicate the 
closure process. For most programme authorities covered in the research, dealing with non-
functioning projects was not seen as an important issue for the closure process.  
 
Across MSs, the quality of the closure process has depended on the administrative 
capacity and governance approaches of programme authorities. Generally, programme 
authorities were managing the closure of the 2007-13 programmes and the launch of the 2014-
20 programmes simultaneously. In some cases, this overlap meant that administrative focus 
turned to launch of the new OP. In other contexts, focus on closure impeded the launch of new 
OPs. Potentially, administrative resources can be stretched simultaneously across four 
programming periods: closing some residual 2000-06 OPs, closure of 2007-13 OPs, launch and 
implementation of 2014-20 OPs and input into post-2020 thinking and debates. The crisis also 
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had an impact on the administrative capacity of programme authorities as public administration 
budgets were cut and staff numbers fell. Closure demands strong coordination, not just across 
programming periods but between EU, national and programme levels and between MA, IB, CA 
and AA at programme level.  
 
More specific challenges are related to ensuring: optimal absorption of funds at closure; 
regularity, legality in closure documentation; and, effective arrangements for compiling and 
disseminating closure packages. A key challenge was ensuring sufficient capacity for AAs. The 
use of annual closure reports were generally viewed as positive in simplifying the closure 
process, providing assurance to the EC and easing the burden on MAs and AAs at the end of 
programming periods. Nevertheless, AA work is particularly intense at closure. A range of 
measures have addressed these challenges at MS level: advance planning for closure early in 
the programming period; proactive approaches to the identification and closure of potentially 
difficult projects; outsourcing or recruitment of additional staff for closure tasks; and 
establishing dedicated pRVWV RU VWUXFWXUHV DV FORVXUH µFKDPSLRQV¶ WR HQVXUH WKH LVVXH LV
prominent across programme fora. 
5.2 Recommendations for closure in 2014-20 
5.2.1 For EU-level institutions 
 
EC closure guidance was valued by MSs in 2007-137KH(&¶V4	$DSSURDFKWRGHYHORSLQJ
closure guidance for programme authorities was deemed particularly helpful. However, 
programme authorities noted that to be effective it has to be provided at an early 
stage in the programming period to allow programme authorities to put 
arrangements in place. Moreover, there is need for clarity and consistency in guidance on 
specific issues where regulations are complex. There were some issues of coordination and 
interpretation of rules between the EU and MS representatives and between MA and AA on 
closure. Key issues to consider include guidance on the treatment of FEIs and State aid issues 
(particularly those involving major projects) during closure. 
 
There is considerable variation in the timetables set for closure, among MS, OPs and 
between programme authorities. Given this, EC guidance should lay out closure steps 
with more clarity. This should incorporate differentiated timetables for different programme 
authorities, recognising the fact that the intensity of the closure work for MA and AA varies at 
different stages of the closure process. Moreover, it should differentiate for specific types of 
intervention, for instance the research emphasised the importance of setting a deadline for EC 
approval of major projects to avoid issues with unapproved projects late in the programming 
period that account for substantial amounts of funding. 
 
The EC¶VHIIRUWVWREXLOGFDSDFLW\IRUFORVXUHVKRXOGFRQWLQXHHVSHFLDOO\IRU$$V For 
instance, pressures on the capacity of AAs at closure should be eased by the requirement for 
programmes in 2014-20 to close the accounts and submit the assurance package by a set 
annual deadline. This provides an incentive for MSs to address issues immediately faster in 
order to be able to include related expenditure in the accounts. This should facilitate closure in 
2014-20. Nevertheless, the role of AAs in OP implementation, including closure increased 
significantly in 2007-13 and is likely to do so again in 2014-20 and this warrants dedicated 
capacity-building initiatives from the EU level. 
 
Beyond financial performance, closure processes should be more closely tied to the 
actual achievements of programmes. Reporting on the achievement of targets is a required 
part of the closure package. However, the amount of the final payment is not directly linked to 
the actual achievement of outputs and results. Although programme authorities were clear on 
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the potential financial consequences of errors or irregularities in closure documentation, the 
relationship between the reporting of achievements and the EC¶V DSSURYDO RI FORVXUH
submissions was less clear. Linking closure more closely to the reporting of programme 
achievements and outputs would fit with emerging ideas to move CP towards more direct 
performance budgeting based on financing more closely tied progress in implementation or the 
achievement of objectives of programmes in Article 67(1)(e) of the Common Provisions 
Regulation. Moreover, a stronger emphasis on programme outputs in the closure process would 
strengthen efforts to communicate CP achievements and raise awareness oILWVLPSDFWVµRQWKH
JURXQG¶ 
5.2.2 For Member States and programme authorities68 
 
MS guidance, support and structures should be established, building on or working 
alongside EU-level support for closure. The establishment of working groups (e.g. the 
Closure Group in Wales) helps to keep closure on the programme management agenda. MS 
input is important in providing tailored support for closure in specific national and programme 
contexts. This can involve setting internal closure deadlines that take into account specific 
programme architectures or the distribution of administrative responsibilities and capacities. It 
can also relate to the establishment of closure-related groups and/or the production of a closure 
µSDFN¶ IRU 23V WKDW FRRUGLQDWH SURJUDPPH DXWKRULWLHV DQG IDFLOLWDWH WKH GLVVHPLQDWLRQ RI
guidance and knowledge exchange. 
 
For the MA, it is recommended that closure is seen as an issue for the lifetime of a 
programme, not just for the final years. Work to facilitate closure should begin at the start 
of the programming period, for instance by obtaining copies of SURMHFW VSRQVRU¶s document 
retention policy and ensuring that EU rules on document retention are understood and being 
implemented properly by project sponsors.  
 
There is a need to ensure that closure remains a priority for programme authorities 
and project sponsors so that sufficient time is committed to the process. Closure must 
be seen as part of ongoing project management in the MA. For instance through: the early 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D SURJUDPPH FORVXUH *URXS DQGRU µFKDPSLRQ¶ WR NHHS FORVXUH RQ WKH
programme management agenda; developing a project plan to establish targets for numbers 
RISURMHFWVWKH0$DLPVWRFORVHSHUPRQWKDQGIRULGHQWLI\LQJµSUREOHP¶SURMHFWVDWDQHDUO\
stage. These issues can be discussed at regular project management meetings. It is useful to 
keeSFORVXUHDVDµVWDQG-DORQH¶DJHQGDLWHPDWPHHWLQJVIRUH[DPSOHFORVXUHFDQEHDQDJHQGD
LWHPIRUWKH0$¶VULVNPDQDJHPHQWJURXSZLWKLWVRZQULVNUHJLVWHULQUHODWLRQWRFORVXUH 
 
Close coordination between programme authorities involved in closure is 
recommended. Close formal or informal interaction between MA, AA and CA is beneficial for 
closure. This can be achieved through joint participation in formal closure meetings or through 
informal interaction through regular contacts. 
 
MSs and programme authorities must ensure that sufficient capacities are available 
for closure. Given that administrative tasks associated with closure are substantial, and the 
fact that much of the work is concentrated in the key period of transition between programming 
periods when organisational flux and staff turnover often occurs, it is important that programme 
authorities allocate sufficient resources to effective closure. This requires careful management 
                                          
68  While the United Kingdom is still in the EU, the English Department for Communities and Local Government will 
continue to manage the 2014-20 England ERDF OP in compliance with the ESIF regulations. The arrangements and 
timing for closing the programme will be subject to a Withdrawal Agreement, which will be negotiated with the EC 
in the future. Different options can be envisaged: programmes run full course with domestic support and close at 
end of 2014-20; or, programmes close at Brexit, in which case special provisions would be needed. 
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of human resources in MAs and AAs: training of staff and the development of relevant systems 
and tools to facilitate closure (databases to track the progress of projects, guidelines, manuals, 
systems, procedures, forms etc.); or the engagement of external staff (e.g. experienced 
consultants) for fixed terms to facilitate closure. 
 
The United Kingdom is an exceptional case. Arrangements for closure will depend on 
the Withdrawal Agreement to be negotiated following the triggering of Article 50 in 
March 2017. The two-year withdrawal process provided for in the Treaties indicates that the 
programming period will be shortened in the UK and this will create significant challenges, 
depending on the timing and content of Article 50 withdrawal negotiations. Three related issues 
can be identified.69 First, the negotiation of an end date for programme eligibility and the extent 
to which the established regulatory procedures around N+3 and programme closure will be 
applied is vital. Whilst programme allocations could be ended at the time of Brexit, rules 
regarding eligible expenditure mean that spending in UK regions could continue to be 
reimbursed by the EC for three years after the final eligibility date. Programme closure packages 
would be submitted two years after the final eligibility date in agreement with the EC. Second, 
programme closure in the context of Brexit is additionally complicated by audit requirements 
that continue beyond the end of the programming period and hence EH\RQG WKH 8.¶V EU 
membership. Issues concerning verification, on the spot checks, document retention, revenue 
generation and FEI resources and possible recoveries of EU funds in cases of irregularity will 
run beyond the closure of programmes. This raises questions of who will be responsible for 
financial management and control of EU funds after Brexit?70 Third, it is important to note that 
these issues will be played out in a context of institutional and organisational flux and reduced 
administrative capacity as UK programme authorities break up and shed staff. 
  
                                          
69  :RROIRUG-µ,PSOLFDWLRQVRI%UH[LWIRU8.(6,)SURJUDPPLQJDQGIXWXUHUHJLRQDOSROLF\¶, European Structural 
and Investment Funds Journal 4 (3), pp. 144-148. 
70  National Assembly for Wales (2016) Consultation on the implications for Wales of Britain exiting the European 
Union, evidence from Cardiff School of Law and Politics, Dr Jayne Woolford. 
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ANNEX 1:  QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBER STATE 
PROGRAMME AUTHORITIES 
LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THE MA 
Closure procedures 
1. What is the FXUUHQWµVWDWHRISOD\¶ of closure for your programme? At what stage are 
the individual elements of the closure package? 
 
2. Are there any domestic guidance documents for closure? If so, can we receive a 
copy? 
 
3. What formal or informal arrangements are in place within the authority to deal 
with closure processes (e.g. specific structures, human resource arrangements, systems 
or tools)? 
 
4. What formal or informal arrangements exist to ensure coordinated procedures 
between the main authorities involved in closure, such as MAs, CA and AA, but also 
the Monitoring Committee? For instance, dedicated working groups, regular (in)formal 
meetings, regulate mailings etc.? 
 
5. Is there a domestic timetable for closure? If so, can we receive a copy? 
 
6. What is your overall impression of the closure process so far in 2007-13? How does it 
compare to 2000-06 [if you have been involved in the closure of past programmes]? 
 
7. A number of changes in substance, form and procedures were introduced for 2007-13. 
From your perspective, which are the most important changes [if you have been 
involved in the closure of past programmes]?  
Financial absorption 
8. How are absorption pressures linked to the closure process having an impact on the 
VWUDWHJLF TXDOLW\ RI WKH RSHUDWLRQV VHOHFWHG HJ WKURXJK WKH XVH RI µRYHUERRNLQJ¶
retrospection, reallocation of resources to OP priorities to improve spending)? 
 
9. What role is the automatic decommitment rule (N+2 and N+3 rule) playing in the 
closure process?  
 
10. What is the impact of specific Commission initiatives to strengthen absorption,  
a) WKHµSKDVLQJ¶RIRSHUDWLRQV 
b) the option of 10% flexibility between Priority Axes, 
c) the simplification agenda (e.g. partial closure, the single audit procedure) and 
d) the extension of the decommitment rule (N+2/3) for some countries? 
 
11. What lessons were learned concerning absorption pressures and closure processes from 
the 2000-06 period [if you have been involved in the closure of past programmes]? 
Type of operation  
12. To what extent is the choice of operations towards the end of programming periods 
driven by closure requirements and, if so, is this undermining the strategic impact of 
programmes? 
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13. To what extent are closure challenges related to specific types of interventions? For 
instance: 
a) Major projects 
b) Financial engineering instruments 
c) Revenue-generating projects 
d) Non-functioning projects 
 
14. What lessons were learned concerning types of operation and closure processes from 
the 2000-06 period [if you have been involved in the closure of past programmes]? 
Governance and administrative capacities 
15. At the closure stage, are there tensions between the emphasis on audit and financial 
accountability on the one hand and administering the programme on the other? 
(e.g. if there are repeated audits, could these have an impact on the availability of 
resources for implementing the programme itself)? 
 
16. Can you describe any issues with the coordination of closure processes? For instance: 
a) At domestic level (between MA, CA, AA)? 
b) Between the domestic level and the EU level (e.g. via Closure Unit, Desk Officers 
etc.)? 
c) At EU level (e.g. between Commission services, ECA)? 
 
17. Do changes in the programme architecture and management tasks in your 
country pose problems for closure (e.g. 2007-13 MAs no longer involved in 2014-20)? 
 
18. To what extent are programme authorities (MA, CA, AA) overburdened due to 
overlapping programming periods? 
 
19. To what extent does your specific type of programme (e.g. in terms of budget size, 
sectoral or territorial orientation) or delivery approach (e.g. centralised, regionalised) 
create particular administrative demands on closure? 
 
20. What impact are Commission initiatives to boost governance and administrative 
capacities having on your closure processes? For instance: 
a) Commission-led training, seminars, TAIEX PEER 2 PEER 
b) the TFBI initiative [if applicable] 
c) any other tools, procedures, systems?  
 
21. To what extent can the governance of closure processes include actions related to the 
communication and visibility of Cohesion policy achievements (e.g. by using the 
content of the Final Implementation Report)? 
 
22. What lessons were learned concerning governance approaches, administrative 
capacities and closure processes from the 2000-06 period [if you have been involved in 
the closure of past programmes]? 
Conclusions 
23. To summarise, what are the main challenges of programme closure 2007-13? 
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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE AA 
1. To what extent does audit put a strain on administrative capacity at programme 
level during the closure process (e.g. internal and external closure audits)? 
 
2. What has been the impact of the rolling audit approach introduced in 2007-13 with 
annual the submission of annual control reports simplified the closure process? 
 
3. Please describe any coordination issues in closure audits (e.g. between MS Audit 
Authorities, Commission, ECA)? For instance in terms of different means of reporting 
and collecting the results of different internal and external audits, identification and 
treatment of irregularities etc.? 
 
4. To what extent does the audit of specific types of operation have implications for 
closure (e.g. FEIs, major projects etc.)?  
 
5. 'LG\RXFDUU\RXWDQDXGLWRI\RXUFRXQWU\¶Vclosure procedures RURIWKH0$¶VFORVXUH
arrangements? If so, what were the results? 
 
6. Have you been involved in the Homologues Group, e.g. at the meeting in Riga in 
2015? If so, what were your experiences of participating in the Group?  
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ANNEX 2:  LIST OF INTERVIEWED EU AND MEMBER STATE 
AUTHORITIES  
Interviews have been carried out between January and April 2017, both in person and by 
telephone. 
 
EU level 
DG REGIO Unit A.3 Budget and Financial Management 
DG REGIO Unit C.1 Coordination, Relations with the Court of Auditors and OLAF 
DG REGIO Unit E.1 Administrative Capacity Building and European Solidarity Fund 
DG REGIO Unit F.1 Closure and Major Projects 
DG REGIO Unit F.2 Austria, Germany and the Netherlands 
DG REGIO Unit F.3 Poland 
 
Member State-level 
MS OP Fund(s) Organisation and role 
Germany Bavaria  ERDF Bavarian State Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Media, Energy and Technology (MA) 
Bavarian State Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Media, Energy and Technology (AA) 
Finland West Finland ERDF Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MA) 
Finnish Ministry of Finance (AA) 
Regional Council of Central Finland 
France Centre  ERDF 6WDWH¶V5HJLRQDO2IILFH3UpIHFWXUHLQ&HQWUH-Val de 
Loire (MA) 
Public Finance General Directorate (Economy and 
)LQDQFH0LQLVWU\ZLWKLQWKH6WDWH¶V5HJLRQDO2IILFH
(AA) 
Italy Lombardy ERDF Audit Authority of the Lombardy ERDF and ESF OPs 
2007-13 
Greece Reinforcement 
of Accessibility  
CF & ERDF National Coordination Authority, Special Service for 
Coordination of the Implementation of OPs 
Financial Audit Committee (EDEL), Directorate of 
Planning and Evaluation of Audits 
Romania Transport  CF & ERDF Romanian Ministry for Regional Development, Public 
Administration and European Funds ± Directorate 
General for Large Infrastructure Programmes (MA) 
Romanian Court of Accounts (AA) 
Poland Pomorskie  ERDF Marshal Office of the Pomorskie Region (MA) 
United 
Kingdom 
West Wales and 
the Valleys  
ERDF Welsh European Funding Office, Programme 
Performance and Finance (MA) 
Welsh Government, Office of the First Minister and 
Cabinet Office (AA) 
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